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CHAPTER I
I NTRODUCTION
Philosophy is concerned not only

~dth

the problem,

"what is being , tt but it also strives to explain ho"; bei.ng is
known and the manner in \V'hic'h being exists .

Hemce philosophy

can be characterized (1) as knowledge of being, (2) as knowledge
of knowledge itself, and (3) as knowledge of existence .

Although

these problems usuall,. make up the constitutive parts of every
philosophical system in the sense that anyone of them having
been raised . immediately there arise others. yet considered from
an historical standpoint , in the course of time, now one, nm1
another has become the object of special attention .
The question ttwhat is being" is as old as philosophy
itself .

Originally introduced by the Ancient Gl"'eeks (Parmenides) ,

it has become a central point of interest in every movement
through the whol e history of knowledge "

Also while the question

of the knowledge of being is an important one in every period of
inquiry , yet Kant was the first to construct a metaphysics of
knol'fleEige for the sake of kno\'Jledge (Erkennen dar Erkenntnis) .
Later the whole of modern philosophy; especially the Hegelian
rationalistic idealism. adopted and further developed tide
Kantian heritage .

r~nal ly,

the problem of the existence of being
1

2

has found its best expression ill the philosophy of existence or
exi stentialism, which is often designated as nthe philosophy of
our age . n

'l'his is the philosophy

~1e

\IJhen we are speaki.ng about

shall consider in our thesis .
exist~nt ialism,

we are not

considering something unknown, or something known only by the
professional philosophers.

Existentialism today , although not

the only i mportant philosophical movement , is the only philosophy
\\fhich in such a short period of time has acquired the unusual
stature of an independent , original and thought ... provoking doctrine
that it even attempts to ente.r into competition with much more
ancient philosophical traditions,

Born in Denmark , l developed in

Germany and France , this philosophy has broken out the narro1t{ limitations of country and language and achieved an international
reputation .

Existentialism at present is the object of serious

studies in all parts of the scienti.f i c' world .

l\iumerous works and

articles are being publi shed in many countries and in many differ

1 It must be noted that general traces of existentialism can be f ound in every philosophical system in so far as the
philosophy treats the problem of existen~ • . In one system this
existential el ement might . be more emphasized , in other less .
Some even attempt to consider St . Thomas Aquinas as an existentialist philosopher (Gilson, Maritain) . The author has no intenti.on to offer one or another amn'ler to this questi on , since he
is merely concerned "nth existentialism in the strict sense:
systematically expressed philosophical doctrine .

., 2
ent languages .
Besides this academic interest the existential movement

has also reached the masses of men:
almost all fields of life .

it has forced its way into

Art and literature (especially drama,

e . g ,. , as in the plays of Jean- Paul Sartre ) are searching for new

forms of expression in this direction.

Even fashions in dress

make an effort to follow the tenets of thi s system.
This tddespread interest might be explained in terms of

a psychology of' fashion: , everybody wants to be au
what is r egarded as the "dictates of fashion .. n

~our ant

of

But besides this,

there are other more serious reasons l"lhich have caused the popularity of existentialism and which make its appearance on the
scene not something une,x peeted or casual .

into the world as a protest, as
of abstract reason .

til

Existentia.lism come,s

revolt against the exaggerations

The various systems of philosophy of exist-

ence unanimously agree in their opposition to abstract speculative systems of thought , which pretend to explain everything by
means of imposing logical constructs; to the "objectivisIft,u where

t he concrete thing , the human existent, has been neglected .

In

common lrlth the American pragmatists, existentialists find themse lves not satisfied ,'lith the tll'lel1-tailored universe H 'Of Hegel .
The Hegelian rationalism attempts to establish one's Forld vie,",

2

See Bibliographx at the end of this work .

by means of a , process from one clearly definable prJ.nciple .

But

it is not able to answer the most important , vital questions of

li fe .

It is not the general definitions and rules that are im-

portant for existentialists , but the individual eXistent , as Rene

Arnoll remarks,3 nthe existentialist is not at all interested in
beauty in general or in liberty in gemeral ., any more than in
existence in garlers.l , since all this is nonexi.stent . n
as such is merely a mental construct.

The general

ftT!itj b.a.t really exists, and

what r eally has any importance, is this individual , the real individual , wh.ich is my self, n says Gabriel Marcel . 4
'I'he existential movement bes"ides protesting against the
ge neral.i21ed theories ·o f kno't!11edge as ignoring life, a.lso protest's
against the social order, which by its ma..n y nisms tl has forced

man into an impersonal , collective anonymity .
slogan therefore is:

syste.m. n5

Irhe existential

man cannot be reduced to a fJpeu"'agraph in a

The individual se l.fcannot be submerged in the mecha-

nism of society .

Therefore exist ent ialism calls

:fOT

a restora-

tion of the freedom and integrity of the human ,p..e;rson ,

c.

3

'ro the

Hene Arnau, tt};Xistenti·a lism in France Today tf tr .. by
!.h! l\~odern Scnoolman , St . Louis , XXIX, 1946-47 , 193 .

1,. Bonnet .,

4 Cited

by Arnoll , ibid .

5 Soeren Kierkegaard , quoted by J . Wahl , 1:. ShQrJ!, Hi stc¥. 2.:t;. Existentialism,
tr. by TfJilliams and Maron, New York, 1949,

5

objeetive thinker it opposes the subjective thinker.
is to be transformed into the concrete.

'1'he mere knowledge of a

truth must be replaced by a.n actual praet icing .
important than the

The abstract

'1"he how is mot'e

~.

Yet in their desire to remedy the exaggerations of ra-

tionalism and formal:i.sm existentialists sometimes go even so far
a s to question every kind of demonstration .

'fhey reject every

form of speculative phi losophy , because all that can be attained
by

reasoning is something general , an object of thought , abst.ract-

ed fr om the fact that it 1;!.

It i s conceivable therefore that in

spit e of the widespread influence and interest on the one hand ,
€:ltistentialism is regarded by some with a certain reservation
and even suspicion, on the other .

Some of the most important

reasons for this attitude towards existentialism might be mentioned :

(1) the ne\1neSS of the philosophy l (2) it s generally hostile

attitude towards the elder philos ophical traditions , (3 ) the or i ginality of the terminology used , and (4) the atheistic character
of the Sartre - Heideggel"ian trend , especially from the standpoint
of a Christian thinker .
Yet one cannot ignore this ne'ltl movement of philosophy
even i n spi te of the fa ct that he woul d disagree with t he principal tenets proposed by existential:tsln.

va cannot classify phi -

losophies int o tot.ally "right tl and "false n ones , as vie can find
mat hematical truths right and fa.lse .

Even in the most challenged

6
doctrine s ther e can be found a grain of truth ,
we may f ind a r.aass of truth .

In existent iali sm

In spite .of the occas i onal aberra-

tions and eccentric i ties of this philosophy , we might say in ge ...
neral t hat existentiali st s are quite right in putting man in the
centre of all problems .

Their effor ts to\'lards recovery of human

di gnity truly deserve our esteem .

Ther efore we cannot f solate

ourselves from these per ennial problems which the existential
philosophy brings out in a ne,\,1 light.

Not in vain therefore

Msgr , F:ossino. t he Secretary of the Sacred Congr egation of Seminari e s and Universi ties , in his keynote address at the philoso...
phi cal convent i on in Rome , Apri l 8-14, 1947 , \'larned:
Because of its widespread acceptance as an interpretat ion of
the human situation and man ' s needs in the present time of
unrest and insecurity , exist~ntialism cannot be ignored by
a livi.ng tradi tion concerned trlth nova ~ vetere. • •• i t \'lould
be unfortunate if opposition to atnei sti c existentialism of
t he Heidegger- Sartre variety tiera to bli nd us to the genuine
philosophica.l values t hat are present in existentialism as
a whole . 6
'rhat studying of existentialism is not a profitles s and useless
"JOrk , but that it is even

!1~ge~s@"'y

for a Catholi c , ha s been point i'>

ed out by Pope Pius XII in his Encyclical Humani Ganeri s .

Warning

against the aber rat ions of existentialism and other challenged
doctrines , His Holiness stated :
Catholic t he ologians and philosopher s , ,<.;hose solemn duty it is
to defend natural and supernatural truth and instil in the

~

6 James Collins , "A C ongr~ss on Existentialism, n
Modern Schoolman , XXV, 1947- 48 , 34-35 .

7
hearts of men , cannot afford to i gnore or neglect these
doctrines more or less devious . Hather they must understand
them 1tlell , first because diseases are not properly treated
unless they are correctly diagnosed , the n , too , because false
theories sometimes contain a certain amount of truth, and
finally because the mind is thereby spurred on t o examine and
weigh certain philosophical or theological doctrines more
attentively . 7
I nspired by these

re~sons ,

the author decided to devote

some consideration to this modern philosophy .

But i t is diff icul

to speak a.bout exi stentialism in general terms, t o formulate a
general definition of this philosophy that could be equally
applied to .§tIl existentialists , since the different philosophers
who are included in the common denominator, called "existentialism, " in fact are quite differ ent from each other , at time s even
radically so .

Besides a great number of common characteristics ,

as their unanimous opposition to abstract speculative doctrines
and their hi gh evaluation of the human person , there are mar ked
di ffere nce s among existentialists., which make each of them more
or less an independent , original philosopher .

There is a distinc -

ion to be made between the "Existential Philosophy " (Exist entialphilosophie) , the chief representatives of which are Jfartin
Heidegger and Jean- PaUl Sartre , and the "Philosophy of Existence "
(Existenzphilosophi,e or Existentielle Philosoph1e) t under the
lea.dership of Karl Jaspers and Gabr iel 1'4arcel .

7 'rho Enclclical uHumani Generia , U"rith a Commentary
by A. G. Cotter, (3 . J . , Weston College Press , \Jeston, 1951, '9 .

These

t,tlO

groups of existentialists primarily disagree

in their notion of, and the approach to, existentialism as a
philosophy .

The Heidegger- Sartre variety tries to develop a

metaphysics, an ontology of existentialism.

The problem of

existence for him is only to serve as an introduction to ontology .
Stefan Schimanski 8 tells us that Heidegger once confessed to hj.m,
that hi.s problem "is not man ' s existence , but 'being-in-t otality '

and ' being as such ' ft

II

For him "existence" is merely a starting

point and means for the elabor ation of an ontology _ Heideggerts
intention i s to inquire anew into the meaning of "Being . "

The

Heidegger- Sartre variety of existentialism "is concerned not "'lith
actual things , ft as Collins remarks , f!but with the signi f icant
strueture of existence
(Dasein) as capable of ontoloc,ic al de ...
,
termination , as leading to a fundamental ontology or discourse
.

upon the meaning of being . u9

The nphilosophy of Existence , "

under the leadership of Jaspers a.nd

l\~rc e l ,

in contrast to the

"Exi stential Ph110s ophy , tr has its direct object of investigat ion
existence as such.

A generali zed theory of being , an ontology

in the Heideggerian sense means for Jasper s a destruction of
existence , since neither being nor existence as such can ever be

8 Kurt F. Reinhardt , The Existentialist Revolt Bruce ,
.Mil'tmukee . 1952 , 132 .
--.
.
,

9 Jame s Collins , "An Approaoh to Karl Ja spers , "
Thought , XX , 1945 , 660 .

9
known by a rational investigation .

Philosophy can reach only the

possibilities of existence" which can be realized only by individual

exist~nts .

An analYSis of the concrete condition of being

means for Jasper's , according to Collins , lO "only a.n intermediate
step in the movement of philosophizing from a general account of

real:l.ty to a clarification of the existence of t his individual . n
These two branches of existentialism also disagree in
the '\flay in which they solve the problem of the Divine Existe nce .
The

thei~tic

existentialists, among whom, as it is generally

agreed, the most important ones are Kierkega a.rd . 1Vla rcel .and
Jaspers, are convinced that man and his freedom e ,s sentially de-

pend on the Divine Existence , that an apostasy f rom Him means a
complete disintegration of' the human person .

'fhe atheistic exist ...

entialism,11 chiefly represented by Ni ,e tzsohe , Sartre and

Heideggerj is inclined to replace God by Uebermensch ( Yf supermanft )
and to announce., the Itde·a th of God, n as in the case of Nietzsche .

10

Ibid.

11 Although V. E. Smith in his critical review of'the
recent works of James Collins (The Existentialists) and Kurt F,.
Reinhardt (The Existenti,alist ~tevoltJ holds that ftboth (1 . e _,
Collins and-rreinhardt) are concerned • • • to ShO'ltl that the god
denied by existentialism is the g od of Hegel or Leibniz but not
the God of' the Judaeo-Christian tradition" The Thomist, XV, 1952 ,
659 .. ) , yet the author questions this interpretation of Collins
and Reinhardt. :Men like Nietzsche and Sartre have expres sed t heir
atheistic standpOint too clearly that there could remain anything
to doubt about •

10

For Sartre this passionate desire or man to become God remains
12
une
-.-. passion inutile .

Hence comes the feeling of human exi stent

as derelict or abandoned (geworfensein) .

Therefore man ' s living

on the earth becomes meaningless , and ends 1'1hen the limit-point,
"impossibility of all possibilitY , 1t namely death , is reached .
I n face of' the fac't of these difference S among the repr esentative s of existentialism it seems theref'ore reasonable to
pick out

~

of them and investi gate his philosophy , sinee other-

\rise , in giving an account of existentialism in general, it would
be difficult to avoid a sehematism .
fallen upon

~

'rhe author ! s choice has

Jaspers , \..nth the intention of giving a critical

analysis of his philosophy under a special aspect, namely , hol"
he treats the problem of Divine Existence .

~~ile

it is true that

the real value of every philosophy essentially depends on ho\v it
solves the most important problems of man , is it not true that
there are no more important problems of man than the problems
concerned with God 's existence?
idea in every philosophy:
depends on this idea .
thinker .

rfhe idea of God is a central

whether philosophy \dll stand or fall

In this respe ct Jaspers is quite a unique

He stands , it might be said , in the middle betw'e en the

theistic and. atheistic exist entialists .

On the one hand , he

admits the existence of God , yet , on the other, he negates the
possibility of a contact between God and man .

12

Jean- Paul Sartre , L ' etre at k

In other words ,

Neant,, 40 .

11

Jaspers rejects every form of positive reli gion, since God f or

him is a " hidden" God, an Immanent Transc endence .
For t his reason the author considers the follo'\.d ng plan
as the best approach for his thesis:

the first part is to con-

sider Jaspers t theory of knowledge as such, its partiicular characterist ics, its possibilitie's and limits .
will att empt to present Jaspers t

questions:

anS~lers

The second part

t o the f'ol101.rlng

(I) whether God can be known , (2) in what manner He

can be known and l;."rhat i s the extent of our knOll'l1edge of God ' s

exist ence , a.nd (3) \4/hat is God .

In the third part

lye

will in-

vestigate Jaspers ' position on t he possibility of a positive
religion .

CHAPTER II
POSSI BILITI ES AND LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE
The questions, Uwhat 1f/e know" and Ifhow we knm'l" are of
fundamental import ance in every ' system of philosophy:

the con-

cept of knowledge essentially deter mines the direction of the
Iwhole system .

Before taking up any of the philosophical problems

[treated in a system one must be previously ac quainted 'ltJith the
theory of knowledge of that system .

Hence , bef ore we speak about

the cognition of God t s existence in Jaspers ' philosophy ,

vIe

\'1ill

dedicate this chapter to an investigation of the problem of know~edge

in general. trying to discern i n what this knowledge

!essentially conststs and what are its pr incipal characteristics .
~aspers

i n hi s basic philosophical works, conSisting mainly of the

i.,wo monumental publications,l and the four serie s of leetures , 2

1 Karl Jaspers , PhilosophischeLogik., Erster Band:
[.on der Wahrheit, R. Pi per , lV1Uenchen, 1947 .
~.
Karl Jaspers , Philosophie , zweite Auflage; Springer,
Berlin- Goett:ln ".,en- Heidelber g , 19Z~8 .

2

Karl Jaspers , Vernunft ~ Existenz , Wolters,
1935 .
Karl Jaspers , Existenzphi1osophie . 1,;11. de Gruyter ,

~roninge n- Batavia,

3erlin , 193 $ .
"1uenchen ,
~,

Karl Jaspers, DeI' Phi1osophi..{3che Glaube . R. Piper ,

19J+$ .

"

Km"'l Jaspers , Vernunft und V.Jidervernunf1 i n unserer
R. Pi per , IvIuenchen , 1950 .
12

13
gives us an unambiguous picture of his philosophical Creed , providing us with good information on the problems we are concernad with here .

A.

Phenomenologi cal sources .Qf existential Knowledge .

In the development of his philosophical thought Jaspers has no

doubt ' been strongly influenced by his fellow- existentialists,
especially Kierkegaard and Nietzsche , yet the philosopher par
e]Ccellence for him is Immanuel Kant)

Kant T s presupposition

that das Ding .ru:! sieh, "the thing in itself, , 4 cannot be kno'Wll ,
is of fundament al importance for Jaspers t phi l os:ophy _

Jaspers

argues that "'Ie are able to know being only as i t appears to us ,

but not as it is in i tself . 5

The reason is that ~,J'e cannot knol"

being as such neither immediately nor mediately .

We cannot knmiT

being immediately , because our knowledge is essentia.lly an intermediate knowledge .

We can knol-"l that \'1hich comes into our con-

sciousness and thus receives its categ ories .
therefore everything that

\'(9

But precisely

know, is only das Sein fuel"

Tt being for us , H and never das Sein

§ill.

~,

sich, "be ing in itself . n 6

3 Kant for Jaspers i s udel" .Philosoph schlechthin "
uThe Philosopher, It see Jaspers , pmosophie, i~inleitung , V1t .
4

l'he author '!frill use his own tr anslations .

5 "Rein Gegenstand i st §!!! sieh keiner los~eloest , E.Q!!dern, \"'a5 ar als qeKenstand i st . j,st ar i mmer fuel' si n Subjekt ,
~ i hn denft:n; Jaspers , Von del" Wahrneit , 23~ee also ibid _,
240 .
6 Jaspers, Del" Philosophische Glaube , 14 .

14
lVhat the subject knows is only the object .

But no object is

being in itself, since every object is only a. certain determinate
.Q.eing .

And yet no determinate being is being absolutely .

fore Jaspers declares:

al~lays !! being . ,,7

There-

ttl can never know being ; what I know is

In other If!orcis t we kno"T objects and therefore

\'1e never know being in it self . '
Vfe

also cannot kno\,1 being as it is in itself through

the mediation of objects .
appear ances of being:

We should regard the objects as the

the object is nothing else but being as

it re veals inself to us .

But the Itrevelation U of being in itself

through obj ects is essentially dif:ferent from the "revelati on"
of any obj ect in the empirical world .

This revelation has one

meaning when we speak about the singular objects of the 1w>lorld ,
for example , "''lfhen we regard color as an expression of certain
light- undulation; it has another meaning when we regard the world
as an expression of being in itselr. 8 In the first case we

7 UNirgends habe ien das Sein , sondern immer nul' ein
Sein . " , Jaspers , Philosophie , 676'":
flEeing in itself" or "absolute
ing" is in fact nothing else but God or "Transcendence,," This confusion of the finite being with the Infinite Being i s fatal for the whol e philosophy of ,Jaspers . For further elucidation of this problem s ee
Chapter III , where the possibility of the knowledge of the Absolute Being is more extensively discussed .
8 ftTheworld in its total ty is not an ob ject for us .
All objects are in the world , but Hone ai' them is the tv-orld . " ,
Jaspers, Der Phil osophische Gl aube, 32; see also J a spers, Von der
Uahr heit , 2')6- 237 .

15
have a simple relation between titlO objects, one of \mich is

thought by the principle of another .

But being in itself in re -

gard to the world is not such a principle as light - undulation is
rrherefore in the latter case '{IIle cannot

the principle of color .

derive from th

'101:'ld being j.n itse lf.

nIt is rather. as if being

\'lould escape from us each time '\V'e attempt to grasp it; as if it

woul d rema.in in the form of objects, which are only the footprints
• . n9 To express this tlimpalpabilityn of being by our
an d r~ma~ns
knowledge , Jaspers calls being in itself das Umgreifende, nthe
all- env eloping .. n

Although being embraces all objects" yet itself

it d oes not become an object of knmtledge .
is kno'Wn

ill

being ; but

\'J'e

Everything we

never knmJ' being i t self .

knm'iledg e al"'I9.Ys remains horizontally limited .

kno'(r!~

Therefore our

And whenever we

attempt to break out of the horizont. the horizont itself moves

alon

with us .

So we can never arrive at the point from "'rhich

1tle

could survey being as something in itself a closed totality~10
In short . Jaspers ' fundamental prinCiple that we are
able to kPOi'IT the object and never being in itself, means that vIe

can only knot" emp.i rj.cal being , but absolute being , which we call
God , is inaccessible to our knowledge It

philosophy in thi s case?

\~hile

~fuat

is then the fate of

the separate sci ences have as

their object of knowledge e mpirical bej.ng , philosophy as such

9 Jaspers J .YQu s!£r. Wahrheit , 37 .
10

Ibid .

37-38 .

16
has absolut

bei ng as the object of its knowledge .

It seems to

deny for us the possi bility of knowing being in itself and hence
means the r ejection of phi los ophy as such .
On the one hand , Jaspers rejects t he traditional notion
of philosophy , as the science of being , with which properly ontology is concerned . "Ontology must fa. ll, " proclaims Jaspers . l l
Those who are attempti ng to gr asp being in itse l f , r emain for him
nalchemists: If

"A.s the alchemists could not succeed i n finding

t he st one of the wisemen , so al so philosophy

~dll

i n i ts efforts to gr asp the SUbstance of being . ,,12

never succeed
But , on the

other hand , by condemning traditional phj.losophy as i ncapable of
knowing being , Jaspers does not re,ject the possibility of phi lOs ophy as such .

He only thinks t hat he has found a new, original

method for phi los ophizing .

Although we can know only that \!'ihich

can be an object of our knowl edge , he s ays , yet we can t hink of
that also \'lhich is not an ob ject of our knm.,ledge .

Since we can-

not think of a thing lTithout maki ng it an object f or us, a being
f or u s , therefore "'hen we think of being in itself ., we ar e
compe lled to t hi nk of it in terms of t he s e f inite objects . 13
But sinc e we cannot identify the f inite obj ect with infinite

11

Jaspers,

12

Jas pers, Vo.n del' Vlahrheit , 500 ..

Ph ilo so phi~ ,

814.

13 I bid ., 23 1 ; s ee also Jaspers , Vernunft und Widervernunft in unserer Zeit , 23 .
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being , therefore in order to be able to thi nk of being in itself,
we must in our thinki.ng let every object "disappear . ,,14

And be-

cause of this "disappearing" of the objects being itself will be
r eve al ed to us , lrlhi ch now will be no more a certain , defi nite
. being , but being in itself or being absolutely speaking .

This , of course . involves a contradiction:
an object and at the same time to let it disappear .

to think of
But

l.iTe must

admit this contradict ion , says Jaspers" if we want to be able to
think of being in itself .

e cannot t hink of being in itself

in any defi nite category , because it \-'wuld be equally necessary
to define being in itself through a contrary category .

But to

think of being through contr ary categories means to admit the
"destruction" (~ Scheitern) of our knowledge . 15 "Yet , ft declares
Jaspers ,16 "onl y through failure in the search f or being in itself do I come to phi l osophize . "

Through the forms of our li-

mited knowledge we can reach the infini t e being only by admitting
the failure of these f orms of thi nking .
by

phi losophical specul ation

'tIe

If, on the one hand ,

are go.:t:ng from f inite objects to

infinite being , so , on the other hand , it means an irrevocable
failur e:

14

the invincible contradictions i nvolved i n our knowledge

Jaspers , Von der Wahrheit , 40 ; see also ibid . , 257 .

15 Jaspers , Der Phi losophische Glaube , 21; see also
Jaspers , Phi10sophie , 705-732; Jasper s , Von der Wahrheit , 20, 67 ,
74 , 232 , 256 , 126, 1030 ff .
16

Jaspers , Philosophie , 3. ,

prove the impossibility of reaching being in itself by our ordinary knowledge .

We cannot regard our philosophical speculation

as objective knowledge , because the

cont~adictions

destroy every value of that kno\,lledge .

involved there

It is difficult , complains

Jaspers . for us to resist the t emptation to regard philosophical
knowledge as an objective knowledge, because thi s temptation is
rooted in the very nature of out knowle dge:
1y

our knowledge natural

tends to separate objects , and strives against such kno\tlledge

in which these objects should ttdisappear . ff

We are shocked l-Then

'ria leave objects and oonfr ont ttthe infinity of being in itself . "

Although

\'Ie

are inclined to r egard philosophical ideas as objecti V(

ideas , yet if

"",e

remain in this state, we remain isolated , and
never will Ttopentt ourselves for being . l7
If philosophical knowledge in fact is no knowledge , what
is then its destination?

The very meaning of phi losophizing for

Jaspers consists rather in the process than in t he result ,.
explains his paradoxical notion of knowledge .

This

I nstead of r eveal-

ing to us absolute being , philosophy only r eveals to us the symbolic phenomena of being .

Philosophy has to show us that the

things we know a.re not being in itself but only the "ci phers"
(Chiff'er )18 of being .

Philosophica l knO\..r1edge cannot transfer us

17 Jaspers , Von del' \\Tahrheit , 257; see also ibid . , 40,
108 ; Jaspers , Del' Philosopiiische Glaube, 21 .
18
"Chi ffre U ..

In some of his earlier works Jaspers spells it

19
into an other world , since there is only one world , but it rather
t1illuminate s lt (erhellt) the objects with a new light, so that
objects obs cure in t hemselves (they remain "obscure ft as long as
t hey r emain only ff objects H "lith no reference to tfbe ing in itselft!)
transfor m into the ciphers of absolute bei ng .19

rl'herefore "being

can be illuminated but never known . ,,20
What

does this "illtuninat ion" consist in ?

It does not

enric h us with any new knowledge, it does not add anythi ng to our
knowledge , but it changes us thoroughly, makes us "new men . "
If everything which we know is to be considered as a separate ob-

ject , then we 'ourselves, too , \'lould be such an object, the slave
of determinism of empirical reality .

But

~;hen

we consider empi-

rical r eality only as the relat ive ciphers revealing to us absolute being , by this

~

free ourselves f rom the slavery of empirical

r eality; by this we become a"lare -o f our freedom . 21

I n this sense

the illumination of being is also an illuminat ion of ourselves,
reminding us to be ourselves .
of hi s philosophy:

Here Jaspers sees the justificat ion

v"hile the traditional philosophy was concerned

"nth a bstract speculation, his e xistential philosophy calls man

19 The nature of ciphers and how they transform into
the "l anguage II of Transc endence "dll be pr operly di scussed in
Chapter III ..
20 n~ Sein kann wahl erhellt , aber nicht erkannt
werden . II , Jas pers , Von dar v,Ta.1i'rfieit , 159.
21
Gl aube . 32 .

Ibid . , 257; see a.lso Jaspers , Der Phi1osoEhi s che

20

to the freedom of belief; since instead of the pretense of ontology to reach being by knowledge , Jaspers proposes a new method
of knowing:
B.

to search for being through a f ree belief.

"9 ompulsive knpwledee" and "fr{;!e belief. It

Since the

proper object of philosophy ., being as such, is inaccessible to
knm,Tledge ., then the only way to come to it is by philosophical
belief .

This belief for Jaspers has a specific meaning .

of all, this belief has a moral character:

i t means a moral

conviction, free from every dogmati c content .
a better

in si~ht

First

In order to gain

into his philosophical belief, it is necessary

to point out the distinction which Jaspers makes between the
truth of "consciousness in general 11 (Be\'ffisstsein ueberhaupt) and
"existential" truth , or between "compulsory" (2ndngende V1 ahrheit)
and Urrea " truth .

The truth of ttc onsciousness in general" is

the ki nd of truth which results fro.m the knowledge of separate
objects of emp:trical reality .

This type of truth i s achieved

by sense experience and logical evidence ., In both cases we
arrive at an objective correspondence between our mind and the
reality .

But this correspondence confers upon our knowledge the

character of compulsiveness (Zwang) , since every judgment based
on sense experience and logical evidence must be accepted .

We

are forced to ackno'llTledge the certainty of an established fact
or a logical syllogism .

flA.s .Bewusstsein ueberhaupt .•. I ex-

perience t he compulsion of the ' non possibility to be othertJllise '

21

when I judge of something as true or false. ,,22
equally valid for all .

his truth is

It is atemporal and impersonal, since it

is not based on our personal conviction but on the objective
evidence of our knowledge .

But practically , says Jaspers , it

turns out to be the least important for us , since our freedom is
not engaged in it..
This

comp~llsive

Therefore

we

regard it most indifferently .

knm'lledge enables us to govern natur e , yet it

does not suffice for us , because it leaves us without any enga.-

geme nt and purpose !O

This sort of kl'lo't'J'ledge is proper to Science

but not to Philosophy .

'l'herefore Ureal truth ff for Jaspers

T1begins where the violence of consciousness in general is removed .n23 'l'his is achieved when we replace the compUlsiveness
of kno\'J1edge by the freedom of belieft

general f! by ftexistent U (Existenz) . 24

the "consciousness in

l1hile by consciousness in

general Jaspers understands the general principles of logical

knOl.,rledge which equally specifies everything (since it offers us
ttobj~ cti'Y:e ff

and "c ompulsory " truth resulte d from the kno,"lledge

of separate objects of empiri.cal reality with no personal engage-

ment) , so existent for him is a synonym for man in his unrepeat-

22

"Als tie't'JUsstsei.n ueberhaupt •• , erfahre ieh den

23

Jaspers. Von dar Wahrhe it , 607 .

Zwa B des Nicht-anders-Koennens als dies fuel' richtig oder unric tig Ell! erkennen . 'f, Jaspers , Dar Ph'IIoSO'j:?llische Clau~e, 2cL.

h

24 Some comment ators of aspers (Re inhardt, Collins)
translate the German term IlExisteoz" into Eng lish as "existence . "

22

able unique ind1 vidua11ty (Selbat).

I a.scend into the rank 0.£

existent when I become mIself (Selbst). wben all activities 0.£
my life become iTeesel.f....det·e rmi.n ations .

To be existent and to

be myself are used by Jaspel's as two interchangeable terms .

to be myself means to be :free.

am I in the truth of

en stance ~

life tru1X !!! e?g2ression

Therefore to raise the question.:
is !!I

means the same as to ask:

5Z! !9I. fre,edom"

t~th

pX"oeess... In short ,

But

and not an impersonal

for Jaspers consists in my f1delity to

myself, "in conformity between the realization of myself and the
...-1... -'
poss l' bl
· e e,A.;!"s"ence

0

r' myse
, 1'·- f '.. "25

Thus. existential truth is not expressed by this or that

content of knowledge. but only by PlX
believe .

,;r~lation .~

that which

1.

ThIs ianG longer a logical truth, but a moral truth.

Notwh!t I believe but the mannfat" 1n which I believe is of im...
portanoe.

Theobjeetive content of beliefohanges according to

time and persons, yet all existent s must be soli.d ar,. in their
lndispeftsable faithfulness to\1fhat 1s truth for each of them.
'~le

logical truth is valid, universally and necessarily J

the truth of eXistential belief 1sradieally historical. that is
to say,. unrepeat.e dlypersonal .

It cannot be 'o t.herw.ise t

since

existential truth does notcons1st in logical content. but merely

,..
23

in a personal conviction, then the belief necessarily is always
ntY personal truth.

Yet this radioal historicity 'Of belie.f does not 'mean fof'
Jaspers a simple relativist.!c subjectivism.
absolut~~es hi,S be11ef.

Jasper,s

here rather

In SO far as the truth of existential

belief is unique, historically ' unrepe~table as my personal truth.
it is the truth

in which I believe unconditionally, abs21utelsl_

Althougbtheeontentof this bellef'is only ol'lGe true for me,
yet at .the same time it 1s for me absolutely true.~6

So Ja.spers distinguishes between the· univ~rsallty and.
a.bsoluteness ,o f truth~

Because

or

his newly introduced notion of

"historical absolute.n ess n thetrad.1.tlonally eorrela.tl venetions
of universality and absQluteness for ,J aspers become problematith
In place o:f the tradItional notion ot: universal:.ity he puts histo-

ricity which :for him is a synonym for absoluteness"

Only logical

truth is universal" but, it is not ab$o~ute because it is derived
.from the knowledgeo:f theempirieal reality.

Seient1.fic k.nowledge

can never pretend to absolute tnth. since it cannot gas, a'bso ...
lute being,

Only the exist61ltlal beliet 1$ absolute, Since j.t

alQne makes us able to "read the cipher-language" of absolute
beitlg .

But again,. this absolutens$s qoncerns not t .h e contento!

belief, but omly the believing existent.

24
On the one hand, th1 s ant1.nomy of the universal c.ompulsi
~enees

of seientifi.e knQ\'11edge and the h1etorical a.bsoluteness

of beliet eompels J aspers to relati v1ee all fflogical" knowledge.

"For the absoluteness of a his'toriea.l truth it is necessary to
relatiVize every content as hj.stQrleEllly finite .form. 1.127

SOi en"",

title knowledge is relati ~~ b@cause it is not able to ·come to
absolute being ,and absolute truth..

Relative also 1s philosop.hic-

al knowledge ini·t,s logical expression,

lute being, yet it
being

!n itself,

fa.il~

to grasp it.

although it seekeabso....

S-eience does not reach

philo·s ophy 1.5 not capa.ble of knowledi! Qf that

being.
On theothel" hand, by rel:a t1.v 1zing logical truth,Jasper.

dogs not negat,e tn$ absoluteness as such Qttruth.
es betwe·e n

th~

He distingu1sj-

notions '0 1 univel"sality and ab$olu1(eness in ox-del"

to show the pro-per pla.c$ torabsolutenes5 , namely, the prope,r

place :9l

~ba.ol~~eness

1! not !A .k nl)wledglb;.tt !a J.aif!t not, la

:!lhipking hut . !!1eJ¢t~:ttn&.

Therefore his philosophieal belief is

absolute not beeaus:e of its content, but because of the uneondi ..
tioned fai thfulne.s:s of the believing subjeot to himse'l f t i
to his own belief.

~

e ••,

Tbere-tore Jaspers warns against the t empta...

tion of wha.t he terms ttcatho!lie1tyU (KatboJ.izitae:t) or "pt"eten...

sion to exclusi ve11la ss H ( J\u,$scb11e$slichke;it2~spruch). 28

27

!1il1d.) 70 ~

28

Jaspers. Von del" Wahrhe1t. 833.

ucatholies tt tel" him are those whoattrlbute to the truth of phi-

losophica.l belief the $,ame eharact,e ristics of universal1t.ya.nd
necessity which is proper only to theseparatescienees, wliicb
are concerne,d wi:th the knowledge 0,£ empirical being.

eit and pernicious to universalize bellef, to

cQns1de~

It 1s il1i....

it

equal~

11 valid for all men, becaue00nly paX"tieular sciences can give
US tr~e

knowledge which is therefot'e universal and compul,sory.

But one

who tries to impose hi.s own type' '0 £ belief upon others,

wbo re~a.rds 1 t as an nul timate truth, ,,29 for Jaspers is a phari-

see.

Such a universali$atiQnof personal belief would be the

source of fana,t ieism.

"All hwna.tl. nobility and greatne$$;n he

says, "is where personal historicity 1s not absolutized.,n30

other word's . ! should adhere to

th~

In

truth of my personal belief

with a.b solute rait·hfulness and at the same time I should avoid
imposing it upon others.

This is a heavy task and yet a noble

one ", It is heavy., bec.a use ncatholi.eity" tempts one by "offelt'i ng object! ve guarantees of salvation. n

It

oft~'t"s

to takeaway

one ta burden of responsibility to searc,h for and to find the

truth.

It replaces the risk by a tranquillity of attainment,.,

But Ja.spers is tdl11ng rather to withdraw him$el£ from thi .s

171.
30

Ibi.d,. , 835 .

26
f·catholie tranqu.illit.y: n

"We better choose all the pain and not

this illusory blessing, where tbe truthposs'Q ssed is only imaginary; rather vie choose hone,st sincerity with all its e,o nse'-

quences rather thansa£e happiness which is only iilusory.,,)l
Jaspers urges one to be what he is, namely, to be tthim...
selfu (Selbst).

ffbi s 1s the way of human dignity and honesty~

ttl want evel"yoody to be that which I am trying to be l
a·e lf in his

Oltm.

truth. ",32

t o he him.

Ho,",ever. by thls.1aspel'$ does not try

to ju.s ti.f y the attitude of indifference toward.s the t.ruth of
others.

Rather he means that " although I aclOl,owledge that others

have their tt'Uth.. reet I must. fight. against it, because this truth

,
33
is not mine,,'

Thi$ eru,s ade of "be1ievi'ngexi$tents ft is not the

fight of truth agains,t, u.nt~tbt it is rather a fight. of' one be-liej

against anotherbelie.f, a struggle of once absolute truth agai nst

another absolute truth . ' This struggle of beliefs is characterized by ,J aspers

&$

the ul'ltll of infinite eommuni<1at1on .,,34

As

the belief Wh1,c h pretends. to be exelusively valid is the source
of' fanatiCism, so the-tree belief which transforms logical knot'1ledge ~nt.o historioal" 1s the source o! communioatiQn .

31

Ibid ", 462 •

.32

Jaspers ) I;hilosQphie, t 668,.

33

Se$ ,1,b:\,4,•• , 696-69g«

34

Jaspers, ner PtlilosophisQhe GlauDe" 134.

1f;i hoever

27
believes that he possesses ultimate truth , ! I!!:t,Ol"j. reject$ tb$
existential

equality~

eormmln1eatiol'1..
anybody-to

which is; the basie prerequisite f¢r '$very

One who alt"eady "posses$$s" truth does not need.

On the contrary, one ,·tho knows that the truth of belief

is absolute <nlly in se .far as it is a principle ae co:r-ding to

"."bien he

J:i.v~J!~

and 'n ot in

$Q

far as it is express0d by one Qr

another logiealeontent; sueh a one remains in the state of a

continuous search for truth.

He remains ff()pe:n ~t (auf~eschlo ~sef1 )

for everjthing and everybody •
is belie! in eommunication.:

a utopia. but belief.. It

Ther'e tore fot' Jasper'$ free belief

flThe ldeaoieommunieation l.snot

nt$a.n$

foreaeh one of us the

questio:n~

do we striVe for it" do we beli.eve in 1t- the poss1.bility

"'!

to

11 ve together ,to speak togethet"'t to sear'ch tor truth t .ogether
and in this mann;0r to become each one hims.el.r. n:';'
All this philosophy of free-belief is 'baaed on the

di stinet·ion
of'

bet~'lflen

ffo()nse'i ,ou$n~s$in

logical and moral truth:

bet\leen t he tr-uth

general n and the truth of' "a'x i sten1;i . n

\lhil.e the one truth is, eXbauste'd by its knowl.edge, t he other

appeal$ to lifEh

Pure logi'c al truth forces Us to

'beea'll$e it is bas'ed on facts, but

~xistent:i.al

a,e1£~owl:~4&.e j,t,

truth

requir~s

¢cm£easl!qn, because it is not bas:edon facts whichl'tould be in. . .

different in regardt,o matl t but it points out and 'filluminates"
ma.n's po.s s1bl1it.ies .

The truth of' consciousness 1n general

exists independently from what we are and how \V'e live}' the
existential truth pretending to point out what we' ought to be
in order that we could bec'ome ourselves, requires from us un...
conditioned faithfulness, faithfulness even to death.
has

No one

to die for a p\11:-e logical truth, because no one livesaceord-

ing to it:

f1It would be :foolish to die for a demonstrable

truth, t'I sinee ftthetruth the oertairtty
not need me tor its, eXistenee,.,n)6

(lr

which I can prove does

On tbeeo,n tr-a rY., the truth

which must be reallz·e d in life .i s one "With '\..rh1eh I can face
death itself.",)7

In this sense the. distinction between logica.l

and existential truth becomes
"the truth

w~hich

tor Jasp$rs a distinction between

suffers front its revocation and the truth which

is not affected by tbe revocation,. ff;g
We have notic'e d t hat Jaspers in his philosophy

or

exist-

encerai$$s anewth$old problemai' the l"elationbetween fal th

a.nd reas'o n., but hi'S formulation and solution of the pl"oblem:ls
radically different f rom t,hat of the tl"adltional philo,s opby.39

36

Ib1d., 11.

37

Jaspers,!9Jl det Wabrheit, 652.

:;8

Jasper$,O$r Philosopbisehe G1ilAbe,. 11.

39 By "traditional philosophyff the author means here
the Thomistic err Scholast ic philosophy ..
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While traditional philosophy holds that reason is able to know
not onlyenxpirieal being? but also absolute beil)g., Jaspers confines re'E lsonmerely to the knowl,e dge of 'empiriealreality, leave ...

ing absolute being to be grasped by faith.

Th~

tradItional

recumn-faith problem Is concerned with the relationhetween

rational knowledge and revealed knowleclg(lq tor Ja.spers it is a

relation between the, seientific knowle,dge Ci. e -t knowledge,
which 1s offered to u.s by separate sciences, for

exampl~,

astt"o....

nomy, biology. mathematios.ete.) and philosophy. wh1,ell tor him

essentially Cl!>onsists not in knowledge, but in belief.

For him

only tbeseparate sciences give us the 't rue knowledge;

only

empirical beingean be known and

l'lO"t

being in itself.

The phi ...

l()sopner £·o r Jaspers cannot knowt he' must belie,v a.

Passing a critioal remark on Jasperst notion ot truth
we can say that, we must- principally agree with Jaspe.r s on the

distinction between truths the meaning of which is eXhausted by
their logical cognition and the truths which receilte their full
meaning only when, besides being known, they are alse realized

in

life.

While our relation to the world ends in knowledge;, our'

relation to God requires fr'om

being .

U$

the engage'm entor our whole

Empirical reality is indifferent to us, but the Absolute

Reality is the very meaning of our life and not only a simple
object of :o ur k.nowledge.

In this sense philosophy revealing to

us Absolute Being reveals at the same time oUJ:'s'e lves:

i..e" IJ

our destination.
comple~E!

Therefore this kind cf truth re'qu1res a

adoption of the knowing subjeet t

knowledge , but also its realization in

not only its logical

lil"~*

Even though an

atheist come to know t.he proofs for the existence of God or be
an expert in t-heo1 ogy • yet the $ssenee of :religion will remain
for him hidden. as 1s light for-a blind man. although the latter
would know the: theory of light.

Ye.t, on tbeothel" hand;, it se,ems that it 1s not neeessa....

ry to contrast so r&d,t eally those t wo forms of truth as Jaspers
does., His truth of the existent remalnsonly a matter of belief
and not of kno\,Jledge .

way-san

nignoran~e,"

Tllerefore in fact Jaspers' beli,e t i s a1 ....
tt

slnee

be11e.f is a l"i sk , because the sub-

strate 'Of' true' ~11e, t 1$ a perfe~t ebj~ctive unee'r t.a lnty. n40
A logical

rel~tivizat1onor

philosophical thinking

as the essential prerequ1s,: tta of true belief':

1seon$ld0r~d

"The philosopher

remains free in so far a.s his idfi:as are coneerned ••• his think'. a. uogma.
A .
, . ..41
·e",omes
'
i ng neve' r b'"

But not to regard truths of phi ...,

losoph1eal belief as dogmas means that philosophy is no knowledge
at all.

It might be

~dmitted

that ther.e are t.ruths whieh require

a mor a.l engagement of the knowing $ubjeet., yet thesuPPositi.on
that these truth. do not give, us any knowledge is

40 Jaspers; ?hilosoph1e t
41

Jaspers, Dar

3 .D

535~

Philo$o~hisehe Glal,l~ ,

15.

exaggeration ·

31
To impl, a moral engagement still does nct mean D ipso toexelude
l Ogical knowledge!t

Acceptable is JaspaJ"s t: thesis that the 1:0....

gical a .s pectQ£ knowledge does not exhaust philosophical think ...
ing. but questionable 1$ hls:eISSU$ to another thesis:

philos,o -

phical knowledge is no knowledge at all , it 1s only a r~lat1v$

expression of free beliet _ Ther'e fore CQllins42 1.$ right when

he

"Jaspers· denial that there call beS$:J$'iotls ph11os'o phieal

SaYSl

truth or knowledge reflect.s upon his own phi losophical cleclara....
tiona.'"

MOl"eover, this transiti on 18 also quali:fied as illicit"

because it does not follow e·o ipso trom the distlnetion made
bet'{Alee.l1 logical anciedetantial truth~

the distina'cion betl'teen ntbe truth which

But since Ja..s pers bases
$l..ffera

frem its revo ....

cation and the truth which is not Q,t fected by the revocation, t)43
on it, it seems to be necessary t ·o, analyze this distinetion more

extens "ely in order to grasp its true meaning ..
Jaspers is right in remarking that the truth of the

heliocentric system was, not in the least affe·c ted

~whenGa111eo,

Oalilei was foreed to revoke it, because hisrevocatiQn did not
make the earth. cease to move around the sun. 44

But, on the othel'

i ·

42 JameS Gallina, "An Approa.ch to Karl Jaspers,"
l..hS!ught,. XX, 1945, 66, Ii!
433ee above , p .. 2$.

44

Jasper's , Der PhilQsophi sei.te Olaube . 11...12.
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band). it muet be said that th-Ettn'th o.f Chr1et did not lose its

\ta.lue fI'om the fact that ·J udas by treason "revoked n i .t .

There,,..

fore in the case where truth 1.$ revoked (although it is rt:1'H'Pl.1.r ed
to be confessed in life), not t ·b e trntb It·self ttsa,.f fersft but the

Il!:rS,2,:q t\rhe revokes it.

destroy 't b:$ truth as
pr,ove attything:

And jus" as tr'ea.$on of'truth does n(Jtt

SUf,:h,

$0, c:il,$ O

faithfulness ,a ,s sueh does not

i. e" ~ the en,s tenee of a. truth" becau.se truth

can be s'o ld out and errol" can be £aithtltllly adhered to .., Ffhe
theory of the helioe.en:tric system did llet have to 'be proved. With
price of the lite of 1,t e author:.

Likewise GiQrdano Brutlo cou.ld

not make true his pantheistic mystieia,m by the faetthat he
proved his faithfulness to it by death.

But it treason does not af'ieet truth as such and if
faithfulness

eV$"n

sense does the

until death does not prove anything, then what

d.16t~: netl(m

from the revoca.tion

andt~e

make betvleen the truth which sufters

truthwh1chlsnQt affected by treaso.

TheTe 1$ an essential difference.

Although Galileits revQcat ion

did not afte(tt his personality, neverthelesiS Giordano Bruno could
not have revoked his philoSQ,hy lrltbout
personality a .• aphilosophel't;

In the

Ii

major 'h urt ot his

f1rs~ C;JMIJ'e

l"evoea:tion of a simple fact,.. 11'1 the other case
eon.sideration a decision:

to betray

there was only

the~e ~amE;)

into

e'onseienceornot~

Thero have been l?eople who haveaho:set:1 daatb rather tha.n
but who were prompted by .id$as which
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were actually eontrcU"Y and there:tore could not be all equally
true.

Therefore all martyrs"

withoutth~

differ ence of' their

convictions, have in common only the same heroic faithfulness
to their conscience.

That 1 s right.

Even one l"thodies for a

f alse i dea subjectively i s a martyr of t.ruth, because he dies'
for t hat which he thinks is' true ..

In this sense

all

uncondition-

ed faithful.ness makes su bjeetively j u st even the one who ~la$

objectively unjust.

But Jaspers is wrong in saying:!£, men

0

to die for contrary :tdeas, then the, personaleonvietion as su-eh

is absolute, whi le the ideas in tihich they believe are relati. vet
because they are historically changing.

calls

ft

In this sense wh t he

existent1al truth" in fact is not the truth ass-ueh, but

conviction as such .

It is illie1t to raise allconvietions t ,o

the rank of truth , \<lhel"'e

tru~h

is no longer contained in logical

content , hut in moral conVietion, which can be e qually applied

to diverse logical contents , singe to justify every conViction
1.8 to d1scriminateagainst truth.

It 1s true that men go to

death for ideas and not for facts" but" on the other hand, they
die for ideas not because they could not be proved otherwise,
but because they believe in the absolute eertaint

ideas""

r

of these

Thus, only belief in the absoluteness , of truth leads to

martyrdom,: not a doubt or
possibility of attainment
absoluteness of truth :J.t is impossible to ltve

..
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faithf\llneS$.

If there were no absolute truth there \'lould be

nO reason to die for anythi.ng.

Instead of justifying all mar-

tyrs of truth every relativization of truth devaluates their
sacrifice of l ife.

value and

therefor~

Faithfulness to one's conviction tsa moral

1:t is a. 1'Ileasure otm3t', l?ut not Ql,truth ..

Therefore an elevation of every conviction to theranlc of tru:th
means an 111ic1ttransition from the moral orael'to

-

order

!>

~

logleal

Moral justification cannot be made logical justification·.

Fa.ithfulness to one t S Ol:m conviction justifi.e s the one who errs,

but never the error itself.

The faet that one believes some-

t hing to be true still does not mean that it really

1!.

true .

Therefore the beliefs or convietions do no·t create truths, but
truth judges all beliefs and convictions.

Convictions may vary

like errors, but all convictions are true in so :far as they
participate in one and the same truth.

Faithfulness to one ' s

subjeet1ve conviction for the sake of faithfulness as such means
a. blind stUbbornness, not in favor of one f a conscie.n ee but in

favor of error ..
Summarizing the above we can characteriae Jaspers' trot
as being anolen and not known .

Namely., ""hen the truth of beliet

(lomes trom free choice, its essence is contained not in the
content, but in the relation between the believing subject and
that content.

Logical content is only a medium through which

one expresses his belief.

It is something like a changing ltlrap
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of philosophical belief:

it changes

~dth

the philosopher .

one expresses himself through a certain content .
content has absolute value in

5.0

assimilateci.tl as Jaspers says:45

Each

But every

far as it is "existentially
"Philosophic al truth is absolut

in so far as it supplements life, but it is relative in so far
as it is objectively known and ' logi cally expressed . "

This means

nothing else but confinement of existential truth in a moral
righte ousness .

The consequence .of this is a radical subjecti vi-

zation of knm)"ledge and degradation of truth , in a word , the
losS of truth .

45

Jaspers , Von del' vlahrheit , 650 .

--

CHAPTER III
EXISTENTI AL COGNITION OF GOD tS EXISTENCE

.
•j

Admitting tlie alogical character of our kno"Vlledge of
being Jaspers denies the possibility of our reason coming to the
kno"Iledge of Absolute Being , the Transcendence or God (these
t erms he uses synonymously) .

Reason discovers only an "empty

space u (€linen leeren Raum) which must be supplemented by the
existent "

Only an existent is capable of existential knowledge .

This knowledge consists in the illumination of the existent ,
namely , 'V'Ihen admitting the failure (Scheitern) of our knm'lledge
to know being in itself or Absolute Being and so becoming aware
of his freedom the existent approaches to God by a free selfdetermination (J<:ntschlu5S):

i"

e.,

in a moral 1/,lay .

So in this

chapter we will discuss Jaspers ' reasons why God cannot be knO\ffi
by ftlogical kno'Vrledge!t (i. e . , our ordinary kuowledge) , and vlhat
is the existential cognition of God 's existence.
A.
~

Symbolic signification Qf Jaspers' proofs for the exist-

.2f God .

The task of Jaspers' phi losophy is to sholtl that

"Transcendence is not to be reached by knowledge . "l

1

Jaspers , Von dar l\fahrheit , 109.
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Transcend-

37
ence is f or us in so :far as

\'1e

are existents the Unthinkable

( 4.~!.

Undenkbare), Ilthe invisible and never empirically demons2
trable Other . !?
His efforts to keep the Deity i'ar from our kno\'ll edge call f"orth a logical analysis of hi s att empts to demonst rate
why the Absolut e Being cannot be known .

Vie cannot knm'l God

thr ough the f orms of our limited knowledge , since through these
forms we c an know only t he separate objects and not being as such .
Therefore any categ ory by which rwe try to define Transcendence
turns out to be an inade quate one and r equires to be supplemented
by a contrary categ ory .

Oux efforts to gr a sp Tr ansc endence by

reasoning ca n be eharacterized as a Ucontinuous tumbling t owards
an i mpos s ibility !II n3
We cannot think of God as a being without being at the
same time compelled to thi nk of Him as a non-being .

In the one

sense non- being means non-existence of something; in another
sense non- being signifies everything that is not determined
(das Nichtsein jed~s bestimmten Etwas).

In this latter sense

non-being i s the verx be ing , since Absolut e Being (or l1being in
it self" (das Sai n !!!! sich) or "being as such tf (da s Sain schlecht -

hin)} is no determined being .

Thus , Transcendence is being and

2 nDas unanschauliche ~ nie empirS.s e h nachweisbare
A.ndere . 't , Jaspers , Von dar Wahrneit , IO'7.
.

3

nEs ist ein immer

!1! erneuerndes

Sic hueberschlag~n

~s Denkens zum NIC'htdenkenkoennen . Ti , Jaspers , Philosophie, 708;

see also i bi d ., 705 - 732 .

non-being at the $atne time .

Only by this paradoxical formula,

where "being and non-being become identical can we think of
TranscEmdence , ff says Jaspers . 4In a like manner Jaspers tries to convince us of the
impossibility of defining Transcendence by any other category:
\"lS

cannot think of Absolute ' €ling as a unieity without being at

the same t:l.me compelled to adrnit the duality , nor as a form ".nth...
out matter , nor necessity without contingency _ Rather , according to Jaspers , we must consider Transcendence as a unicity and
duality , form and matter , necessity a.nd contingency , universaltty

and individuality , eternity and temporality .
sible to think .

But this is impos-

Therefore a oategorical thinking cannot reveal

to US Absolute Being . 5

Jaspers conceives another sor t of categories , t1hich he

calls the trcate ories of freedom,u such as reason {V'ernunft) ,
spirit (Geist) , freedom O'reiheit) , and eri.stence (Existenz) .
But by these categories , too 1 it is impossible to reaeh Trans-

cendenee , because it would mean a degradation of 'franscendence

to the level of human finitude . 6

4

Yon

Jaspers , Von der

We have no ri ght to absolutize

~lahrhe1t ,

260 .

5 Jaspers PhilosoEhie 705~7 2g ; see also Jaspers,
del" INahrheit , 20 , 2i16-JOl, 090 , 1030 .
6

Jaspers , Philosophie, 728-732 .
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our reason , "to make it Log os , Creator. ,,7
right to imagine God as a pure spirit:

Neither have

\'19

any

although it is a more

noble picture of our imagina.tion, yet it l.oJ'ould degrade Him .
are not even supposed to absolutiz e t he existent himself:

\')e
bei ng

free an existent is basically a possible existent (moegliche
E:Jcistenz) , or Us. being which does not exist J but ....lhic h might and

::::.=--- '
. .t

must ens . • ,,8

But Transcendence is an absolute being whi ch

"wipes off every possibility . tt

We cannot

identify Tra..1'1scendence

\-11th the existent , because the existent is conscious that he

stands before Transcendence and therefore he feels that he is not
Transcendence:

ltlvhere I properly am myself I know that I have

been given to myself (class fch mil" geschenkt \-Terde) py Transcendence, the pO"ler through ~(hi ch I exist . 119

There f ore all our effor s

to r each rrranscendence by the categ ories of our knot.;rledge are
condemned to an inevitable failure . "There is no direct kno't'11edg
of God . " 10 We may ascribe to Divinity thousands of names , but no
name is ade quate .

Each time 1':e begin to think of God " He

"escapes" from us .

I f . . '9 l1fould be able to know God by the f'orms

7 Jaspers., Der philosophische Glaube " 27; see also
Jaspers , Philosophie , ~9 ... Pl~(j .
8

Jaspers ,

~

Philosophisehe Glaube, 18 .

9 Jaspe rs , Von del" Pahrheit . 110; see also
Existenzphilosophie, bb7 --..
,
10

Jaspers, Del' Philosophi sche Glaube , 33.

Jas pers ~

•
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of our kno't'lledge , God "lOuld cease to be God, be cause "demonstratec
God i s no more God . ttll
Ye t the admission of the failure of our kno"Vlledge to
grasp God is not entire ly senseless:

although we cannot a r ise to

the knowledge of divinity by our reason , yet our reason turns us
totl'lards Absolute Bei ng by the very experience whi ch we arrive at :
flIt is possible that there can exist ,s omething vv-hich it i s i mposIf '''e cannot know what 'rr a nscendence is , yet
know that Trans cendence exist s . l3

sible to know . ,,12
V.fe

We cannot come to kno"tl Tr ansce nde nce ,

ecause Tr anscend-

ence does not speak direct l y to u s, but only thr ough ciphers .

Everything t hat exists proclaims Transcendence , s i nce everything
ean be considered as ciphers of Tr anscendence .

Every obj e ct is a

ci pher in so far a.s it is s omething more than \'llhat
know of it .

\<16

are able t o

We transform the ndeaf and dumb ob jects" int o a

symbolic language of ciphers when we relativize the obj e cts to
phenomena , 1-"hen we cease to consider them as noumena . 14

11 "E.in bewiesener GoU ist
Q.fg: Phi lQ..sophi SCIie Glau be t 30 .

Gott . f! t Jasper s ,

12

"~

13

J aspers . Von del' Wa hr heit , 1031 .

ist denkba1" t dass

~ . IT . Jaspers, phiIosopnie, 7~

-

14 I bid .

~

~

gibt , :,J'as nicht de nk bar,
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~~'hat

is the relation betvlTeen objects and ci phers?

gvery

object can be transformed into a cipher of Transcendence , since
"everything that exists in the world is a symbol . n15 Although
all object s can be changed into ciphers of Transcendence , nevertheless t he ciphers themselves do not constitute any !.ill!! vvorld ,
l6
as existin apart from the world of Ob jects .
Object~ ~nd
£1..Hhers are rather.

t \'19

dimensions .Qf the

when we consider the vlOrld as

a

constituted by objects ., but when

.~,~ ~

flbrutal reality , IT
\'1e

"'Ie

same world:
see it

consider the world as a

symboli c language of Transcendence, we see the objects as ciphers
of rrranscendence *

"Ciphers are not new objects J but objects
filled with something new . nl7 In this sense Jaspers compares
the relation existing bet een objects and ciphers with a relation
existing between a. herbarium and fresh plants , or a collection of
bones and a living organism . le
What kind .of relation exists between Ciphers and Transcendence?
"language 4"

15

C5.phers are not Tra.nscendence itself , but .only its
Tr anscendence speaks to us t hrough ciphers, itself

Ibid.

16 rtThe world c'e ases to be ''1orld when it is trans f ormed
into the l anguage of Transcende nce . n , ibid ., 634 .
17 ttC hiffer.si~d kefne neue . Gegenstaende , sondern neu
er.fuellte Gegenstaende . , iEla .,]15'43 .
18

Ibid ., 1036 .
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beooming no cipher;

HGod is not a cipher, but the very reality . n.'9
.

Ciphers are only symbols , 'l'rans cendence i s the absolute being .
Ci phers are only a medlum betive en Transcendence and us:

a s the

kno\'dedge in the case of consciousness in general is a medi ator
between the subject and the obj~ct, so the ci phers mediate

between T. ransc e n d ene€: an ('1,1

'
t en
· t
eX1S

'" 20

And yet although the

ciphers ar e not Transcendence itself, on the one hand , Tr anscendence is not beyon~ ~ ci'ehers , on the other.
ci phers get into any nothern world:

vIe cannot through

tl Being in it self i s not an

other reality hiding itself behind the reality we knolt-J .,,21

Jaspers makes a distinction between Ciphers and symbols
or s i gns ( Sym\>91~ O$ter Zeich.€q,;d . 22

w'hile mere symbols signify

t hings eXisting independently of them, in the case of ciphers it

i s i mpossible to di stinguish between the Ci pher and the thing
symbolized by it .

The Absolute Being , signified by Ciphers ,

inhere.,s ~.mme diate lY

lu

its sxmbol .

And if we cannot i dentify

Tr anscendence with any of its Ciphers ) it is not because Trans-

cendence l'loul d be hidden behind the Ciphers , but because every

19 Ibid ., 1051 .
20

Jaspers , Phi1o s ophie , 68$- 689 .

21

Jaspers , Von.s!£!: Wa hrhe it , 103 2 .

22

Ibi d ., 257 .

cipher remains only a s ingle aspec"ll of Tr anscendence .
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23

This reasoning leads Jaspers to a conclusion that we

must admit an "imma nent Tr anscendence " (die ,!mmanente Tra,.nszenden, ) .
An "abstract monotheism" whi ch admit s an nothern 1tlorld is only a
"nega.tive i dea" which degrades this wor l d . 24 Instead of distinguishing between Transcendence and the world ,

--world

,

itself seek :for Tr anscendence :
--",,

.

~

'.tIe

must in. ~

liThe world is the place

where Transce ndence speaks to us . ,, 25
I t seems that a.dmi tting t he ffimmanent Transcendence"
Jaspers comes dart..gerously close to the pantheistic notion of God .

But soon it becomes clear that this suspicion , in so far a s
Jaspers is concerned , i s an unfounded one .

He argues that an

alternative such as t he ism or pantheism is possible only in the
order of logical

kno~T1 e dge

or knovJ1edge of consciousness in ge -

neral , '\-There God and the world are thought .Qf
the ~ level, as i f they were objects of the

E!§.

II they ,..Iere op

SBa-ne

kind .. By

think:i.ng s o, says Jaspers , either the vlOrld means everything , and

so the 1rforld becomes God , or it means that there exists God and
26
the world, and in this manner God is but an nother n world .

23

Ibid . , 108 .

24

Ibid . , 1050- 1051 .

25

Ibid . t 108 .

26 Ibid ., 90 ; see also i!&£., 107: "That , in which an
through \'I}hi ch ' are we there t (~:;;.? sind) > i s the '.<forld . That ,
I
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But such a ttdouble ... ingtf Jaspers calls a naive materialization of
Transcendence , where the thing s belonging to this world are
transferred to the "beyond , ft and ",here they are enlarged and minimized ac cordi ng to one f s n ad . 27

Existent finds Transcendence

in unity ",dth the 1}lorld and not beyond the ,,,orld .

neither Hc1 j ,e

"ili

blo~se 'ltlelttt

There exists

(the ftbare " ltlorld , the worl d only) nor

reine Transzendenz l1 (the pure Transcendence , Transcendence

only:) . 28

The s impl e ide ntifi cation of the world and Transcend ...

ence as 't'lell as their radical distinction i s to be rejectpd, says
Jaspers , sinc e by adm5_tting pure immanence or pure transcendence
we degrade the ''forld .

Only when the ..,orld is changed into a

language of ciphers its true va lue can be saved .

'lPmen

1,.,;e

distingu:i.sh 'the ltlOrld f r om Transcendence, we are no longer able

to eva luate the world l>dthout illusions , since the brutal reality
of the l'lorld as such cannot satisfy us . 29

Only the existent is capable of reading the ciphers;
only he .i s c pable of transforming the Hbrutal" objects into

transparent symbols, because tlTral'lscendence reveals itse lf only

in ltlhi ch and t .hrough which hive aT'a we-ourselves t (wir sind .Selbst)
......- . ;;;;;.;;..,;;;...;;,.
and free , is the Transcendence. u
~-

Von de~

27 Jaspers , PhiI050~hi~ " 684- 6g5 ; see also Jaspers ,
irlahr-heU, ~9 , 107 . 70.
2$

Jasper,s , Von der v-lahrheit , 980 .

29

Ib~d .,

107.
\
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.,

for 19. ~...:
..'1...1.. s · en·t · . n30
t·

I n other words , a s long as I remain outside of

the rank o£existent , I can see only the world a.nd nothing mor e .
Just as in sense knowledge the organ fmlst s omeho\'iJ' g et in touch
"lith the object in order to knm'IT 1:1; , so man must become existent

or tthilllsel:f" i f he ,..ratlte to get in touch with Tr a nscendence "
if, on t he one hand , I can understand the language
SO

And

of ci phers in

far as I bec ome myself, on the other hand .. I become myse lf in

so far as I expose myself to the speech of ciphers .

I am an

existent in so fa.r as I turn myself to Tra.nscendence (by tlre ading
its cipher s ff )

,

and vi,es vga.a.:

I am able to turn mysel.f towards

Tr anscendence in so far as lam an existent .
l~Jha.t

does the reading of ciphers consist in?

F'irst of

all , reading of Ciphers does not mean any kno\'d .e dge of being ,
since " it would be fal se to regard symbolism as knowledge . fl 31
{ather readi ng of Ciphers means producing of new ciphers:

HThe

!philosopher reads the ciphers of being by creating ciphers of
nind . nJ2

Philosophi c a.l k no\,llecige is not an objec ti ve kno\'!lledge:

philosophi c al c oncepts are only the s ymbols of Ciphers .

'1"0 make

philos ophi c.al idea s knowledge means to degrade knowledg e itself .

~f

\'lTa

arr ive at the knowledge of' Tra nscendence t hrough Ci phers , we

30

Ibid ., 110 .

31

Ibid .. t 103$ .

32

-I bid .
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arrive at the knowledge of Being !.! inaccessible !2. our logic a l.
Knowle~dE.,e .

'f here fore Transcendence reveals itself to us as at

hidde n God .

fl God iJ?

nor knm,q . oJ>

e .,

(i ~

exists) , but Whom

\t{e

neither see

'l'hus , the philosophical reading of ciphers is

neither true , n,q r fa;tse , because it is no knowle dge at all in the

or

strict sense

the tio:rd .

For this reason the reading of Ciphers

cannot be subject to a logical criterion, but only to the existentia:). cl.. . iterion:
t he existent ?
vic~

true , and

does this or any other philosophy strengthen

I f the answer is positive , thana pbilosophyis

In other words , it means:

versa .

does t he

existent recognize in it, his Transeendenoeor not 73 4-

Since philosopbical reading oi:c:J.phers is not a logical
kno"l11edge of' Absolute Being , it therefore cannot pretend to a
universal validity ,

Each existent reads the ciphers only for

"An object is a sign of' the Other , 'tJ'h ieh is not stra nge

hi mself.

to me , but i s t hat through whi ch r am properly mysel! or lean
be properly myself . n3 5

The\\fay leading to God is not a \-ray of

objectbra certainty; it ianot a way of certain and universally
valid proofs of' God' 8 exi stence , since "after Kant all ontology

Vernunf'~

33

Jaspers ,

34

JaspersJ V,on der

35

I bid ., 257 .

und

Exi$t~nz "

30 ; see also J a s pers ,

J aq del" ~\[ahrheit , 1049 : t'!3ut t he one God i s di s tant, the entire ly otner . a b solutely hidde:th It
.
~{ahrhe1t ,

110 .
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stands condemned . n36

We ean :rea ch God onl y by existential belief,

itlhich is historically personal and the characteri stic mark of
which is its objective uncert.ainty .•
B.

SearcF for Q.2!! ,through !. revolt

aga;nst~ .

Since God

cannot be known by log ical knOYlledge but only by a philosophical
belief, then the whole philosophy of

Ja~pers

is marked witb a.n

invincible tension (S:eannung) between certainty and uncertainty ,
between a defiant revolt

('l'ro~.~)

and a trusting self... resi gnation

(Hi!?:g,a.beL.,37

Namely , I "open" myself to the cipher-language o f

Tr a nscendence

\~hen

I become royse'l f' , and further, I oocome myself

whe n I enter the limit-situations (Crenzsi tu.ationea) such as

death , pain, fight and guilt , 't-'fhere I experience a radical contingenoy of the reality . "''1hieh is surrounding me) 8
these limit-situat.ions I am shocked .
"Ihy t he world and eV'erything

Entering

Thoughts come to my mind:

t hat exists is rather imperfect,

defi cient and contingent i nstead of being perfect and absolute;
l'fhy instead of truth and good there is so l'lruah untruth and evi 1

in our 11£e?39

Is this life where evil, pain and death prevail

36

Jaspers, !!xistenz;;ehilosophie , 17 .

37

Jaspers ,.

Philo s.oEhle~

736 .

38 5Situations become l~m1t-situations "" hen they awaken
the existent in man t hrough a radic al shock of his whole being . n
(italica of the author of the thesis), 'J'as'pers , Phi+os.$'Ehie , [,,9 .
39

tfhis peSSi mistic element of Schopenhauer is a note

common to all existential:tsts .

worth living at all?

mine, because it

"-18.8

I refuse to consider the li£e I live
give n to me without me . 40

~

Having once

experienced this I no longer can live peacefully.

Therefor e my

entering into limit -situations t urns out into a revolt against
that \-.,hieh i s going on in the world .

I r a ise a voice of protest

agaihst disor der of the ,,,,orld and life .

But , on the ot her hand .

whil e pr otesti ng against li fe I at the same time feel longing
for life :

a longing to come back to that against whi ch I have

, 11 d • 41
reoee

.r ut that i s not a

logi c'a l conviction , not a. logical

reasoning which can reconcile me with the life .

The only \\Yay to

overcome my revolt against the Ground o f being is the 1tlay of seli l'r esi gnation , which means , I should take life as it is .

I find

my \'1ay back to Tl"anscendence when I change my hateful disposition
to life into a convicti on t hat this life has been given to me
and I am r eady to acoe pt it . 42
This reSignation of mysel f is based on no tttheodicy"
'I'lhich looks f or arguments to explain and justi£y t he evil . 43

Evil ha.s a real existence , theref ore any effort to deny it would
be vain .

An nexplanati onft and Ujust i f icationtl of evil on the

40

Jaspers , Philosophi e . 736 .

l4-1

Jaspers ., .Y:.Qn del" llahrhe it , 718- 719 .

42

Jaspers , Philosophi e , 740 .

43

Ibid ·.
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basis of its neces,s ity for "universal harmonyn or uorder n 'vould
mean to come back to the same illusions from which man once
escaped by his revolt against the order of life and t he \'J'Orld .

There is no scientifi c explanation . since nealf-resignation
renounces knowledge . n44 Rather the reason for ,such resignation
is a 'c omplete ignorance,

HO\rlever , this does not mean a radical

negation of that \-{hieh it is Rossible to know, but it ratber
means that we should give up any pretense to know that TJ'rhich is
accessible only for belief and not for kno,"lledge .

In this sens,e

self-resignation is nan active confidence , whi ch in i gnorance
turns us to''1ards Transcendence . u45
Since self- resignation cannot be based on kno\'J'ledge ,

\-'fe

remain ina continuous tension bet,,{een .self-resignation and
revol t .

The possibility t o raise a voice of protest ane't'f can

never be put aside once and for all , since in the ""orld there
is ahmys happening something "\-'Ihich cannot be justif ied accord ...
ing to our standa.rds of right and wrong .

Therefore our attitude

t01flards life should be a continuou s winning the self... resignati on
in face of the reality l;1'hich always stimulates us to revolt .
UReal self...resignation J5 possible only through a surmounted
46
revolt . n
A complete overcoming of the tension between revolt

44 Ibid ., 742 .
1,,5

Ibid .
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and self-re signat;ion 'liroul d be possible only by an evident intervention of trranscendence itsel£', but if God would reveal Hi mself
t o us in a visible waY , then ne ither revolt , nor self-resignation
would be any IO!l..ger possi ble , s i nce there \Ifould remain for us
a blind obedienee . 47

only one possibility:

By r emaining hidden

Tr ansc endence 5hol-IS u s t hat i t ltrants nno blind obedience , but
freedom , \'lhere a revolt is al't",ays

.

,4$

POSS1 bie 11 1

Existential free -

domis that 'l.'1i1ichstimulates the seareh for Transcendence .

Thus ,

the revolt as S1,lch against Transcendence i s rather a negatiVe
communication with Transcendence:

HRevolt against God is alre ady

,,49
a. seare h f or G0 d ~
The tension betW'e enselt-resignation and revolt original

ly is a tension betll/een freedom and Being , bet·l-leen existent and
'l'ranscendence .

Every attempt to surmount this tension either

lead s u s out of the world , or it cause s us to sink into brutal
reality .

If we absolutize the revolt and cheCk out our longing

for self-resignation

l"le

fidence only in himself.

have a Promethean eXistent , having con ...
There is free dom \'lithout Transcendence .

I f , on the other hand , "" e absolutize self-resignatj.on and remove

47

_.
Ibi d .

48

49 "Hadern mit Gett 1st €lin SuCh9l'! Gottes . n f. Jaspers ,.
!:h.ilosophie . 743 .
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the possibility of a revolt

t-l€

have Job ' s ascetic existent , tmo

has lost his freedom in t he pr esence of Transcendence .
he.ve Tra.nscendence \'Jithout freedom. 50

Here \'le

I n althar case we would

de stroy ourselves as existents .

I f' 'If.le can absolutize neither the revolt nor self-re sign
tion , we cannot re·lea.s e the tension betlrleen theIr! , for in one

case we wou l d become victims of nihilism, and in the other case
"fe wou l d l ose ourselves i n t hat passive slavishness . '\'IThere one
p i ous 1y f a 11 s on h ~" s k
_ nees t0 ·vvorsh':L.p ~.' d 0 1 s .. 51·

The eJU..s
~ . .( t ent 'loS

saved in so far as this tension i s maint ained .

A constant pos-

sibility to revolt against 'Tr anscendence assures for the existent
his fr e edom, and a self- resi gnation leads the existent to Trans -

Irherefore the true vocation of every existent is to

cendence .

rew.ain freE2.

i]l

the Eresence of Transcendence ~

ffThe more I a.'fIl

orientated to'1lV'ards God , the more I am myself , and the more I am

my self' ~ the mor e I a.m orientat ed tOl'lards God . n 52
In short ,

'111)'e

abso l ut e l y hi dden .

cannot arrive at God , be cause He remains

But by t his very failure of our knowledge

ascertain our freedom.

By remaining hidden God presents us \'Tith

50

Jas per s , Philosophie ,

51

IbiS _, 443-.444 ; see also ibid . , g19 .
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freedom "'Thich we have to appreciate , but not lose :for the sake
of any idol, as Jaspers warns :
I~lfan

should not fallon his knees before any sort of i dol:
either of his O\<l"!l personality " or tha.t of' lnankind , or God
as a person ~ Agai nst all possible idols and against Transcendence r evealing itself man must fight , defending his
right, ' ' 'h ieh he has received i'rQnl the distant Transcendence:
God wants that I remain mys~lf . ~3

c.

Guilt ,

rut tpe waI

~ ~sc gndence .

'l'he ul1knO\\fability

of Transcendence is for Jaspers the very condition of our freedom .
Therefore a question arises:

what sort of freedom is this, which

forces him to guarantee it by an absolute hiddennes,g of Transcendence? , The consciousness of freedom for Jaspers is essentially connected \\i' ith the consciousness of guilt "

'dhen he says that

we are able to come to the hidden 'rranscendence only ttlTough
f reedom , he means that the consciousness .Qf our
t he ye:r:v: proof of the eJeistenc.€ Q.;f God .

culp~bilityis

Our feeling of culpa-

bility points out for us the fundamental truth:
myself , then I am no longer myself a.lone . n54
just alone , by ourselves ,
i ble to anybody .

l'fe

But since

If we \'i/'ould be

would never feel guilty or re spons.."

'Vie

actually do feel guilty , the n

there mus't exist somebocy else besides us to whom

responsible .

U'f'hen I am truly

\'\[e

feel

ttlI' there would exist no Transcende nce, I vlOuld

53
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alit1ay s ask myself' why I desire something at all, or I would do
everything i>'nthout any feeling of guilt .. n55
Our feeling of culpability holds us back from
tizing our freedom .

If' , on the one hand ,

'\I'le

absolu ~·

are free , on the

other hand , vie a.lli'!ays are consci ous as ft being g iv6n ft (geschenkt -

56

geworden) to ourselves o

:F'reedom i s not absolute .

Otherwise

it ltmul d be ttemptytl i f it was not confronted w:1th anytl ing .

Instead of that , freedom rather i mplies a longing to be surmounted (aufge hoben) .

But it can be surmounted only by Tretnsc endence ,

. t:.7

lt/hich has given to us our existence and our freedom • ./

VIe have seen that our consciousness of guilt f or Jaspers

is the chief- witness :that we do not ex:l.st alone in t hls <'{orId ,
but that we stay in the presence 01' Transcendence "
guilt means aversion f r om God , by de1'ini

But since

freedom as guilt

Ja.s pers ultimate ly defines freedom as .freedom a gainst God .

I n short , Jasperst search for the Absolute Being rtight
be sumrnarized in this manner:
ence , there \'lould be possi ble

if there ~lOu l d exist no Transcend ...
OUI'

arbitrary action , f'or I.'Thich tve

'i'l Ould feel no re sponsibility or guilt .

But since we actually do

55
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feel responsible for our activities , than t here must exist God
to Whom vie are responsible .

lJloreover; if God

\~loul d

be knowable

in the strict senee, ''fa automa.tically would be compelled to
obey Him, and. as a result of that , -vre would lose our fr e edom"
But with the loss o,f freedom there would disappear automatically

the responsibility for our a ctivities .
remain hidden .

'l'herefore God must

CHAPTER IV
EXI STENT I AL ATTITUDE TOWAliDS POS ITIVE RELIGION

Characterizing his philosophy of existence as a free
belief, Jaspers separates phil'o sophy from sciences .

Philosophy

is not sCience , because it does not give us any kn.owledge in

the strict sense of the word .

We can arrive at kncx\Tledge of the

objects of empirical reality through separate sciences , but hei
as such , \·lhich i s the object of philosophical knowledge , cannot

be knoirffi by rational investigation, for it can be reached only
through belief.

At fi rst sight it may look as though Jaspers ' phi losoph
should come nearer to

religio~

than any other philosophy , since

it i s principally ba.sed on belief', whicb is a characteristic mar
of every religion .

Yet it is not so ,.

Jaspers separates philo-

sophy f rom religion as well as from sciences .

Since his philo-

sophy is a t'ree belief, it stands in an inimical relation with
religion , vlhich is based on .authority.

Philosophy is a belief,

but it is not an authoritative belief.

Being essentially a free

belief Jaspers t philosophy is incompatible with any authority .
tt

All free k nm<ll edge rise s against authority, tI because nit
55
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attempts to prescribe t h e content of knowledge f or us . n1
Although he admits a. tension existing betv1een philosophical belie ~
and scientific
one :

kno\i'ledge ~

yet t his tension is only a relative

if philosophy is not science , yet it presupposes scientific

knO\.;ledge in so far as it is c'oncerned "nth empiricalreallty .
Therefore there iano absolute hostility between philosophy and
I t is othermse in the ease of religion .

science .

To be a phi-

losopher and at the same time to be a confessor of a rel:t gion

f or , Jaspers are t,,,o a.lternati ves radically and absolutely . incompatible with each other .

ti 1i~or

possible. but not r el=!-gion <\H2
to

fi~ht

against reli.gion:

the philosopl,ler as sueh faith is

It is necessary for a philosopher

tf Philosophy may contract

wit h science, but it must fight against religion . ,,3

Ii

friendship

'r his h ostile

attitude tot-farde religion flows fl"o·m his conviction that philo ...
sophy ,.;ould lose its .fre edom by subn'litting :i.tself to the authori-

ty of Revelation .

Perhaps , Jaspers admits , if the usupposed u

Hevela.t ion was !:,ea:);ly t'the word . of God , ft t hen it would be i mpossible to i gnore it.

fill' we had to' ehoos.e

betw~en

it "lOuld be impossible not to ehoos'e God . ,,4

God and man,

The same idea he

1 Jaspers , Von der vla~:rheit, 81.3; se e als01.bid .j 808 !
"Therefore it is necessary to r::Lgnt continuously against aut hority . tt
2 Jaspers, fhi. l.osophie, 252 •

.3

Ibi d ., 25L.

4

I,bid .. 271 .
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expresses in a somewhat sophistical manner:

if God really had

revealed Hi mse·lf to us , then even the greatest absurdity itself
could not be considered as an objection against this Revelation:
. If' that (1 . e., Revelation) were an accomplished fact, Revelation would be a fundamental and ultimate truth , which
could not be surpassed by any other truth, and where every
question concerning its possibility, actuality or contradictoriness \'lIQuId be frail . The Revelation would be the
beginning of all our search for truth . Our every truth
then should be submitted to Revelation and not Revelation
j udged by our previous knowledge of' truth .5
This is a sophistical reasolling ; since Jaspers admitting that
even an absurdity would not be an objection against Revelat ion
if the Revelation were an accomplished fact , rejects the possibi lity of a Revelation by rejecting every historical \"Iitness o
Immediately he raises the question:

lation is truly lithe '\t/ord of God7 TT
ses , answers he himself.

of God . ,,6

how can

\119

know t hat Reve -

We must rely here on witnes-

Yet "the wor d of man is not t he word

I n so far as Revelation is transmitted, it receives

5 "VIenn das geschehen waera , 9ann "laeTS die Wirklich~eit
diese)t:' Offen"6ai:iin~ ~a~ erste unCi das letzte , daB , \'1orueber kelona
~'iahi"hElit hinausge en kqennte , depa,gegenueber alle FEa~e nach del'
r~oe~lichkeit , nach empiriscner faktizitaet und nae , Wid0r spruech-

lie kei~ aufhoarts . Die Offenbarung staende !!!! !!1la~·al1er
unsarsI' v/ahrheit . Die se tvahrheit haette sieh nach i , nieht die
5f'fenbarung nad,.i. p.nsere~ vor~ehende!!1;JCiihr~swrssen zu richt"en. tr
Jaspe.r s , VQP. del'" iPlaIirhe;z.t ., ~ 2.
6

tfDas

r~wns c henwort

ist nicht mehr Gotte s Wort

Jaspers , Del'" rnrlosophische (a~e , ' 56" -

-
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the form of

.finit~

every human truth ,

truth , which is the proper characteristic of
Revelation is for this world , therefore it

receives all the limitations of the \vorld *
subject to logic and human experience. n7

"The truth of man is

Revelation for Jaspers is an absurdity , for it preaches
that \1hich is impossible in itself. for example , the dogma of
I ncarnation .

nIt is an absurdity that God could become man or

man become God " u8

All the proofs concerning the Re .s urrection of

Christ are false, because they try to prove what i s impossible in
the world .

We cannot rely here upon witnesses , because we know

fr om experience about witnesses \-.rho ,\1ere subjectively sincere,

but \...rho witnessed pure illusions.
Having rejected the proofs of witnesses, Jaspers comes
to the criticism of the content of Reve lation .
Chri stianity for mor al reasons .

He re.jeets

A logical absurdity for him doe s

not mean an ultimate condemnation , s i nce "absurdi ty is the form
of r evelation of Transcendence through reasoning .. n9

Instead of

rejecting categorically a.bsurdity as such , Jaspers distinguishes
between a "r evealing absurdity" (das offenbarende Absurde) and a
"misguiding absurdityU (das !!l die I1"1"e f\lebrende Absurde)
does this distinction mean?

Jaspers ' God is a hidden God .

7

Jaspers ; Von del" 1JJahrhe:i.t , 852.

8

.
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Ibid • . 8

9

•
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fore from the human standpoint it would be absurd that God could
come into contact with man .

But such a contact could be possible

from the standpoint of' God , although it would remain an absurdity
for man , yet a ltrevealing absurdity, n since God in this case vloule
reveal Himself to us and thereby enrich our knowledge by grant-

ing us some i nsight into His

Olm

nature .

But de fact o the Bibli-

cal Revelation is not n'the word of God " and hence it is a ttmisgui ding absurdity," namely , in so far as it is based on the
erroneous supposition that God has spoken to man .

So for a phi-

losopher "the myth of God-f.1an is a misguiding absurdity , nl0 for
the r eason that nit does not lead us through the Agape of love to
Transcendence , but rather ·e nfetters us 'Vlith empty dogmas . "11
Jaspers also makes severe objections to the personality
of Jesus , not only as MeSSiah, but also as man .

Jesus was a H\l}'o rld-shy" personali ty, that He

\~as

He o1jects that
rather ·'an ex-

ce ption, but not c omplete man , n becau,s e He lacked "active sense
f or the world and knovdedge . n1 21'o follo"1 Christ means for
Jaspers tlto want a life which leads to self...destruction . 013

A

perfect realization of Christianity l"l<)uld destroy man t slife .

Ther ef'ore Christianity is in fact a compromise with t,he require-

10

-Ibid ..

11

I bid .

12

Ibid .,

854 .

11
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menta of life..

Yet Christians , Jaspers objec't s , a lthough J on the

one hand , they cannot themselves tallow the teaching of the
Gospel , by their pretension to exclusive truth are ugly fanatic .s ,
on the other ,,14
Having rejected Revelat.ioI1 as a. tt misguidlng absurdity , n

Ja.s pers turns his criticism tOl!Tards every form of religion .
of all , he attacks dogma ,. designating it as "myth"

Firs

(~lytl'lUS) .

Believing in dogma i s characterized as ttbeliaf against reason,

not beyond rea50n. n15

To accept dogma means the same as to

"sacrifice the intellect .ft

Religious cult , too, is rejected by

Jaspers , because it &"Upposes a personal God ;.

A personal God is

nothing else but anthropomorphism, where absolutized man is made
God ..

Therefore Divine PrOVidence is only a ffsublimed magic. n

It is an illusion to believe that God cares about us and requires
prayers from us, since U'real 'franscendenee does not ask from us

either cult, or propa,ganda . n16

Prayer , as assurance of divine

help, hinders one from the search for God instead of encouraging
him .

The Chm. . ch, Jaspers f inally says, is a h,.uman institution,

14

Jaspers , Dar

Philos~ph~pc~e

Jaspers , Von der WahrneI"t, 85' .

.
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since "the 't'lord of man is not t he vlOrd of God . tt 1 7

It is rather

an expression of :fI'Jacht\'lil1e ( lIthirst for .po\<lJer U ) of priests , who
promise salvation for their subjects in return for their blind
obedience .

There f ore the philosopher must fight a gainst the

Church , since otherv/ise blind obedience "wuld mean treason of
freedom wp.ich is the most valuable . ,1ft God can give to man .
li'or this reason Jaspers urges the philosopher to choose betv'J'een
1g
the two alternatives! religion or reason.
J.II.fan cannot sellout
his freedom and his reason in f'avor of authority.
against the ffidolization of God" i s a necessity f or

The fight
1nan ~

This

crusade is the inevitably necessary task of the philosopher , if
he t'lants ttto preserve his freedom t .hrough ind! vidual risk ", ,,19
Following Jaspers t reasoning

,.,e

notice his peculiar

inclination of' speaking in paradoxical t er ms:
of being

'V'Ie

in the knovvledge

think of it in terms of objects a.nd yet these objects

do not give us any knol'J'ledge of being as such ; in the cogniti on
of God f s existence we come to knoV'f God through symbols or ciphers
and yet t he knowledge of ciphers cannot be r egarded as knowledge

at all .

I t seems that paradox is a necessru."'y element in Ja.spers t

philosophy .

17

Indeed, after havi

urged man to fight against

Se e above, p . 57 .

1$ flDie Wahl zwischen Katholizitaet unq Vernunft . tJ ,
Jaspers , Von der traErheit , 857 ..
.
19

Jaspers , Philosophie , 257 .
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every .form of religion, he unexpectedly declares: TtRe ligion is
not an enelny of philosophy . 11 20 Is this a contradict ion or a. re ...
vocation of his prev.i ous statements?

Not at all .

His criticism

of religion , as he says, is directed only towards a certain .form
of religion, namely , religion

in so .far as it becolnes rigid in

its "misleading objectivity. n

"Philosophy .fights against reli-

gion , yet alt·,a.ys against a certa.in religion in its untruth . ,, 21
Religion for Jaspers is ttuntrue 'tr in so far as it is ftobjecti ve tl ;
it is fl obj'ective " in so far as it is expressed by a certain dogma
cult and Church .

For this reason

religion must be r ejected .

But the very source of all religions , from t'lhich all confess i ons

originate, forces our philosopher to change this hostile atti tude
towards religion into an attitude of respect .

Vie must respect

religion as a possible truth, although a truth of others, i , e . t
we must respect religion .e.§. truth, although it is

~

till truth

(die Wahrheit nicht fuer .m!.£h) ..

UTtere is truth in religious
existent even if it be not appropriat.e d by me . 022 In other h!orcis
we fight against objectively expressed religion (because it is
t1falsii'icationft in the sense that ttthe word of man is not the

word of God") , but , on the other hand ,

~

must respect religious

conviction .!§. such , since such conviction is truth f2.;:

20

Jaspers . Del" Philosol:?hi.sehe Glaube, 61.

21
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Ureligious

existen~ . n

trhis negative and destructive criticism of religion by
Jaspers is followed by his s.omewhat positive approa.ch to religion

when he says that ttthe contents of the supposed Revelation (die
Inhalte behaupteter Offenbarung) , cleansed from their characteristi c s of absoluteness and exclusiveness , can be substantially

assimilated philosophically as eiphers . n2 ,3

Al though Christ was

no God , yet we can regard the f'myth of Christ" as a ful ly authorized cipher which can medi ate between God and man . 24 Also personal prayer approximates to philosophical contemplation , and even
merges in it , when it is cleansed from its utilitarian characteristics .
with a

Yet , s ince prayer is to be considered as man's relation
p;ers~::ma!

God , i t is radically different from philosophical

contemplation , and therefore transition from prayer to contemplation is like transition from the order of religion to the philosophi ca.l order .

Although considered from a philosophical stand-

point prayer is better tha.n lithe complete lack of rfranscendence , tt
yet philosopher as such can never submit himself to the practice
of prayer without spoiling his personality .

HHe ,

too , '-muld

like t o fallon hi s knees , but he ca.nnot do it before that ""hich
is only a human product U (i . e .. , God , in so far as He is made an

23

Jaspers , Von Star V{ahrheit , 1052 _

24
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object of adoration) " 25

Yet our philosopher gives up prayer "uth

a certain feeling of pity in his heart:

"Prayer is a possible

realit y , lacking t.micp. I experi ence grief r ather than tt'iumph •.tt 26
The same sense of hardship Jaspers experiences , when he finds
himself as a philosopher compelled to remain outSide of the
Chureh l ,

He admits t he tremendous role of the Church in creating

and preserving culture , and the unquestionable richness of its
tradition; but he cannot accept it, since it is only a puman
institution . 27

Ther efor e he f i nds himself f orced to fi ght agai nst

its pr etension t o exclusivene ss (Aus schJ.iesslichkeitsansprueh) .
"Every confessi on is good , 1I since "every pious community gathers

its members :from all confessiotls . n2 $

hut

one cannot remain in

the Church , \"1here the philosopher i s excommunicated by the theologian.

The best thing , says Jas pers , is to r emain all"1a.ys a

ffprotestant" in so far a s the Church i s concerned:

"I dare to

remain i n the Church as a heretiC , or , in other \'lords , prot estant
par !3xce J,lep.c e . n29

Jasper s t expression that one might remain i n the Church

25

Ibid . , 259 "

26

lbi p •• 267 .,

27

Ja s per s , Del" Philosophische yl aube , 65 .
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29
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'"

as a ttprotestant tt does not mean that one could belong to religion
and at the same time be a philosopher .

Contrari'l,..rise , even admit -

ting the insuff.iciency of philosophy in solving religious problems
one is not supposed to turn hims elf to religion for ans\l[ers ,
because "the hidden T:ranscendence forbids t he philosophe'r to re ...
turn t o r eligion. u30
betray his freedom.

One c annot usaeri.fice his i ntellect U and
Therefore Jasper s requests

n~m

to ma.ke

ell

deci sion, either for phi .l osophy or tor relig ion . , uThi s deci sion
is such that no honest man can avoid it J. i f he does not want to
remain in the dar kne$s of indecision ",,31

But decision fot' philo-

s ophy cannot become denial of !_eli.gion !!. such, Jaspers

,\;'l aTns ..

It \¥ould be perniCious to philosophy, because ffphilosophi .c al
eontent sexist in masses alao i n the form of religious belief .• ,,32
Therefor e the t ension existing between philosophy and r eligion

should be understood as a readiness of philos ophy to lend
ing hand to rel i gion ra.ther than

~s

a denial of religion .

help-

at

ttTend-

eney to aid religion is a prete:nsionofevery philosophy . n33
This aid of philosophy to religlon consists pr incipally
1.11 the efforts of philosophy t o influenc e religi oll i n the sense

30

I~Jc\,,, .

259 .

31 Ibid., 258.
32

Jaspers , D¢.1f. PhiJosophi sehe

33

Ibid _t ($9 "

GJ,aub~,

$5 ..
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that the latter should give up its pretension to the exclusive-

ness of truth .

Religion should give up its standpoint that its

t ruth "binds everybodytt (allgemeingy.eltige Wahrheit) , since
"pretension to exclusiveness is only a human prpduct , but not
founded in God. Who left many ways leading to Hi m. tt34 This pretension to exclusive truth is unjust as well a.s perni cious for
us _ It i s the source of all fanaticism .

It doep not belong to

the essence of any confession that any of' them "TOuld be considered as the only t rue one a nd binding everybody .

Biblical reli -

gions, especially Christianity , have submitted themselves to the
temptation of exclusiveness .

And since this will of exclu sive-

ness is mostly rooted j.n the ftGod ...:b1a.n myth , ft Jaspers says , 3 5

U"l€

must abandon the religion of Chr1b"t which regards Jesus as God . ff
Thi.s t elig ion is true in the sense t hat God sEeaks ~ !!'!!!l ~ hrough

!lli!!!,.

But God never speaks exclusively through only ~ man .

Ghrist is not God , but man , the last of biblical pr ophets,

through whom God has spoken .
(entmI!!hl,sieren ) religion!
beratel y .,
religion is

Therefore Jaspers

,~oul d

"demythize ft

tf pemythizing here cannot stop del i -

Also the most thoughtful myth i s only myth ,. ,,36
possib~e

True

only \vhen it is cleansed from myths l-/hich

75 .

34

Ibid ~,

35

Ibiq •• 80 .

36

Ibi..d •• £31 .
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coneeal from .our eyes its essence .

religi on consist in?

What then does this fltrue tt

Jaspers does not hesitate to present us

\vi th a general outline Qf. the "true n religion:

PhilosQPhi cal belief considers the following mQments Qf the
biblical re ligion as essential and true~
Acknowledgment of the one GQd !l!
}vian is absolute in his decision bet\lreen good and evil .
Love is an expression and realiza.t ion of man's desire to Ii va

for ever .
Man's internal and external a ctivity is his prQbaticn .
The leading i deas of the world are historically absolute ,. but
they cease to, be absDlute Dr exclusive when they are expressed "

World is created and contingent; it is inccnsistent in itself
it is lacking a perfect harmony and crder. because .of the
limitations and imperfections involved .
V.Je are subject to the experience .of limit-situati ons .
God is our ultimate and cnly refuge . 3?
This sort cf rel i gion "'r hieh Jaspers propcses to us is
more like a phil osophica.l doctrine than r eal religion .

ill

l is at -

37 . flMomente d;ieser Ylabfheit , UQch etomal ausgesprochen,
E,tlilo.soph,ischer Glauoo 1 sind:
'
- .
~
der {1edanke dese!nen uctt es ,

,gas ~wussts~ del" U;t'6edi~:the;it ~ Eni? s.ch~JduEt~ zld.sc he~

Gut und Boese !.!!! endb.chen .~ns c hen ;
.~. i~ T~t - hi.,nne..re.n und: aey.sseren .!!§l.lldelns ... ~l§ Bewae~rung

·e s l'vle pse . en t
. •
aie tJ.tdnUpgSldeen de)." l.'lelt a I ,S ~war J9weil§ gesq,ht.chtli c,h
unbed,l.ngte , abel" ohne Ibsotuthel.t und Alleipgy.eltl.gke1t ihrer
~rscfieiqunf · -

-

. -

.

die U¥!9sc71ossenheit clair ' gesohaffenen i'?elt , ihr Unbestand
a'Us ~l.ch , das V'ersagen a lle!' Ordnungen !!! (frenzen , lli lk..
fihrung des Aeussersten ,
4.i~ letzt~ Hnd einf(iige Zuflucht P~J. Gott.• tf ,

Jaspers , Der Phi losoEhische

Glaub.~,

$2.

tempts to ureforra tt religion in their ultimate results lea.d to a
complete denia.l of a posi t i va r eligion, since by ncleansi.:ngfr r e ligion fr om "myths" Jaspers practically takes a"'lay its very

essence .
In this connection it must be remarked ,

hO\'1

superf icial

is the opinion of those '\1ho classify Heidegger and Sartre a s

c hief r epresentatives of atheistic existentialism, and regard
Jaspers and r·w.rcel as Chris·tian thinkers .

If Gabriel

reel

really merits the name of Christian existentialist, the same
term ca.nnot be ascribed to Jaspers . 3$
There must be acknowledged one positive chara cteristic
in Jaspers' philosophy , namely , his logi cal consistency (in spite
of the fact that "logic" is the object .of his m.ost serious critiCi sm) :

if being as $uch cannot be known , t hen God must remain

{thidden, n but where a personal God is denied in a philosophy,

there is no place left fOl"

<it

positive religion in such philosophy ..

But t s the price not too hi gh:

to sacr ifice fundamental tz"Uths

f or the sak e 0.£ logical demands?
•

t

38 The author at t he beginning of this work has purposely charact·e rized Jasp.ers as a nt heistic existentialist U (see above
p . 9 ), . but in clzassifY.i ng the existentialists into atheistic and
Christian, as some commentators do , Jaspers should be left out .

i

CHAPTER. V

CONCLUSION

The author does not consider this presentation of
Jaspers t phi.losophical thought as being a complete picture of." his
system .

This "t'las not his original intention .

He has confine d

himsel f only to the problems directly or :i.ndirectly related to
the teaching of Jaspers concerning God ' s existence .

But no phi -

losophical consideration should be missing a critical evaluation
of the method and solution of the original problem .

'l'herafor e

the author will devote t his chapt er to a criticism of problems
discussed in the previous chapters .

He considered it appropriate

to postpone the criticism to the end of the "lOrk rat her t han
criticise Jaspers f philosophy portionally , since in the case of
Ja.spers t he particular problems remain quite obscure unless they
are subsumed under a somewhat gener al pi.cture of his phi l osophy
as a. \'lhole .

For exa.mple, the full meaning of his distinction

between objects of empirical rea lity and being as such becomes
clearer only when he discusses the problem of God t s existence and
considers these objects as relative ciphers of the Absolute Being .
So in the first part of thi.s chapt er it will be pointed

out that Jaspers ! moral interpr etat ion of knowledge gives us an
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explanation of his position regarding the existence of God; in

the second part the advantages. and deficiencies of Jaspers' phi losophy '\-till be considered "
A.

Ja.s ps rs ' philesophy ,u. metaEfursic s ba·sed 2!1 moralitx _

Jaspers has not found God by ra.tional investigation.

Rational

cognition fer hiro is only one 'p art of knowledge which must be

tfsupp1ementedU by the whole human being, or , i .no'ther words ,

completeknolflledge is that '''hieh is realiaed in life .

No 1'hi10-

sophy f or hi m is complete in its logical expression_

It must be

" supplemented" by the

~x1stent,
.

as it has been
. previously

Usupplemented U by that philosopher , who . once through it , ha.s
slepT·a s.s ed hirose·l f in the sense that he lived according to that
For example , ! a$ a reader must be ftsupplement-

which he taught ..

ed tt by living out the philosophy l>lhichis presented to

Iile

in

Jaspers' teaching .

Also God can be approached only by the
means that our k.no,"lle,o,ge {}lone cannot lead
supplecmented by

l'1

liS

e::dste~~ "

which

to God unless it is

e xi stence ft of the knowing subject .

Therefore

instead of' llil.l..a1lX kno'td:g.s God Jaspers rema.ins in a cp-ntinuouf!
eearch for Him.,

The aim of existential knmil'ledge is not knot-F-

ledge, but appeal .

ftThe truth of existential knowledge consists

not in the content as such, but in "" hat is going on in me during
the moment of knowing . 11 1

1

Jas ers

Von

And what is going on in me during the
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process of knO\nng is nothing else but the awakening .Qf nwse 1 f !.!
This existentia.l "a'\'lakening of myself" is the very

lliI'$el,f . 2
ma~ sure

~

at:

t1l1.lthenticitI of philosophieal knowledge .

Itruly

and in so far philosophically knoYJ', if and in so far as I transform

;nys~lf ~

!!l

~xistent .

Therefore existential kno,,,ledge is

either authentie , and then it is inseparably connected irlth the
kno'l;;ring subject , or j.t is unauthentic, namely , as a content of

somebody other than myself,'

Th1s interpretation of knowle dge

c onfers a moral ehar'a cter on Jaspers t< \<,Thole phi losophizing , since
morality essentially cons ists in appeal .

As long as moral prin-

ciples are merely known and not carried out ill life , they remain
useless (although they do not lose their meaning
case)"

e11€lfi

in this

In the logical order the 'frtay of knowledge is the only . ..;ay

to truth, but the tl"'Uth of the moral order is essentially the

truth of life .

In other "vords , as long a s I do not live accord-

ing to the moral principles, I am al"''1ays morally

ledge alone here is not su f ficient .

\In.jus~ ..

Knm.,...

In this sense moral knO't'lledge

is only and in so far true , when and in so far as it :ts realized
in life .

This is the clue for the better understanding of

Jaspers ' r>hilosophy .

What in log ical sense seem to be inconeei ve-

able paradoxe s, in the moral order turn out to be serious truths .

2

Jaspers, Phi,losophie , 3.

3

Ibid _. 676 ; see also Jaspers . Del" rhilosophische

Glaube , 123 _
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Vlhen Jaspers demands that we relativize every truth and advises
us to remain in the '{flay of continuous search for it , it means in
the log ical sense an illicit elevation of the sear ch as such in-

t o the rank of truth itself .

But this is true in the moral order

be cause of t he fact that moral perfection cannot be obt ained
once for the \mole life ;w
long as

lVioral goodness must be strived for as

live ,. says Jasp.e rs ; 4, and there he is right .

''ITO

This mor a l approach to Jaspers' philosophy enable s us to
grasp t he true me aning of his statement, that existential truth
is absolute not because of its universality , but because of its
histori c ity . '

Jaspersian truth is not a truth of knmdedge , but

it is a truth of life ,. a truth of concrete acti.v ity .

But life is

always "historical, n s ince its place is ttin time,n and. it cal'mot
elevate it self to the state of atemporality, to eliminate i tself

fr om ntime n as knowledge doe s .

In this sense it ,\.,ould be unjust

to speak of' !tun! versal act! vitylt in the same sense in w'hi ch
speak of' t he universality of knoltJ'ledge.

\'le

But we cannot affirm

either that universality , in the sense of absolute validity, is
a property of knowledge onlJ!: , and that activity must allflays

remain relative .
lute.

Our activity, too , must somehow be made abso-

It is elevate d to the rank of absoluteness in so far as

4

t'If I \'lould stop search1;n g , I would cease to exist It tt

Jaspers , Phi losophie , 676 ; see also Jaspers , Von del' VIahrheit ,
222 .

5 See above , p . 23 .
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it is based on stempo:ral values !!

Thus , although moral a ctivity

takes place in timet yet there inheres in it an et ernal value
"d'h ich obliges us

$0

absolute ly that \.;e can fae ·e death itself .

Moral value.s !!! such are, absolut e , ; yet moral activity is a most

personal activity.

While ,in other activities I can be replaced

by somebody else, my moral perfe ction

tion .

is

In this sense morality is a field

my most personal obl:l.ga~lhere

absoluteness yO-

incides with personality .•

I n the same moral sense we have to understand Jaspers t
teaching that Uexistential truth is that 1tlhich binds us t f and that

"it has its source in commllnication. n6

It means that the object-

iva cri terionof truth must be replaced by a oornmup.icati va cri terion .

HEA"istential knot'l}'ledge requi:r:'es a s pecific criterion of

truth , which cannot be objective ••• a philosophical idea is true
in so far as it stirs up cornmunication . n7 Thi~ statement again
i s based on a moral interpretation of truth .

It is true that

moral activity is not subordinated to an objective criterion in
the same sense as ,

f'o~

example ., our social ; economical or tech-

nical activity is subordi'n ated to the ends and goal s \-lhieh are to
be attained 4!

This latter activity is judged according to its

objective results .

---------

But the criterion of moral activity is our

6

Jaspers , Del' Philpsophisehe Glauhe , hO.

7

-Ibid .

7/+

conscience..
ob.jectJ.ve

Our moral aets recai Vfl their value not because of

r0sults~

but because of the faithfulness t ,o conscience .

Althou,gh the phllosophyof e:).'is't;;cnoe has a moral eba....

raoter yet, it is not just a sort 01' moral philosoph" or ethics.
Here rathr i s ,aqueation of a ne,"! t'e-eva untion ot the r-elat_ons
exi8tint! betlrtleen ethics and metaphysies t/

vIhile tradit10na

ethics

takes its principl'e s £'ro'm mett!phyaj.es . the philosophy of existence
bases

m~ta.phys:tes

accusedo£ .::ts
slogan of

aneth es...

str~eneos

Philosophical spaeulaticm haa btl!en

to 11£e ~ and

.~bensph~!os,02h1e.

tries to introduce a upbilos'ophy of

life , 11' or . a.t least, one close to life.
of

th~.s

aspers. following t.he
F.th1.cs becomes th

. ource

ph11oaoph.y f since it points to activity and not to ab...

straet knmtledge lO

The eld.st.antial 's ubject. of knoilrledgo is not

logical, but moral personality .. It 1oe1cal subject of' eonscioue-

n$SS in general is l1mitedonly to tbe knowledge of
reality.
~,n.t. 0.;..'110

The problem of Absoute !mint;
10 n moral p .rsonality.

aris~$only

~mp1r1eal

for an

E];gt3~...

It the vlay to God is .an eth cal

\tay t t.hen tho truth of God has l'llor.•J and not logioal ee:1"ta!nty ..
Thltt certainty or God j,s the c ertaint.y of moral conviction and not
. he certainty oJ: loe1cal ko 'ledge:

tl'l"he reality of' Being is the

real! ty of' conscience" ,,8
Th:i.s Ittol"al interpretatl.on o f. J8SPOl"-e

....
r~
.......,;;;;,d=s~n,...
. ...s .

a
ft J

r~nrea.l$

to us t he

75
very structure of the philosophy of existence .

Jaspers preache s

the impossibility of knowing being in a logical w·ay , and the

"empty space " left by logical knowledge is to be filled in by
I'texistence , n

By this he confers on his doctrine of unknowability

of truth t he character of moral demand .

When he logically

Uestablishes n the fact that Absolute Being

II

unkno".,able, he at

the .sa.me time morally demands that Absolute Being !!I!!.§1 remain
Ul'j{uowal:>le...

According to Jaspers, since being in itself , because

of its alogical character , cannot be knovm in a logical way ,

Abso.l ute Being also must be sea.rched for in an alogical way , na.-

mely, through existential freedom .. This logical unknol'rabil" tyof
being is the very condition of our freedom . 9

I01..lst fa.ll in order to save ethos:
order that our .freedom be saved .

Therefore logos

God must remain hidden in
If' Transcendence had r e veal ed

itself to us , we would have cea.sed to be "existents U since ou.r

f'reedom l-Tould be destroyed .

God want s us to be free, thercfOTe

He remains hidden .
Although Transcendence must rernaJ.n hidden i n order that
we as existents be saved, yet there would be !!2 existent wi thout
Transc e nde nce.

Transc endence is that Hin which and th.rough which

we are we-ourselves and free "ulO

9
10

The human being is a.n existent

See above " p . 21 ff' .
Jaspers , Von der Wahrhe it. 107 .
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in. so far as he is Cl\t'lare of his freedom ; he is free in

80

f ar as

he is conscious t hat he "has been given to hi ms e l f by Transc end...
ence "nll

In other worda, it is necessary that God exist, yet He

lntlst remai n hidden in order' that

\'le ..

as exi stents , wou ld be s aved

fro.m destru ction.

As

'IIle

have seen , Jaspers ' philosophy of existence, in

spite of' its ethical character " is something more tha n a simple

theory of ethics .

Insta'a d of developing moral conclusions of a

given metaphys.i cs , he di c tates metaphysics itself in the name of
morality.
B.

"lay 9t: truth . or

.e.

bY-'ll/a!?

t'le cannot

raise the question

in the case of Jaspers, as we could raise in the case of Sartre ,

raetzsehe or Heidegger:
not ?

is his philosophy atheistic , or is it

As we have seen, t he whole pbilosophy of Jaspers is full of

longing to find God .

v.!hy then do all his e fforts to find the

Absolute r esult in his fat a l admission t hat Hfailure is the last

12
word? "

We can anSl'1er t hat it happens bec ause Jaspers devalu-

ates our reason ( a characteristic .feature common to all existential ists) .

EY..ist enti a li sts , according to Jacques IJftSritain, 13

have "thrown out reason, tl by c onfining it to the kno\,lledge of

11

See above, p . 53 .

12

" Pas Scheiter:n 1st das Letzte ,. n t Jaspers , Phi 10 s opl1i, IJ

13 Jacques J'ilaritai n F.xistence and
Galantiere - Phelan . Pantheon. 1948" bO .

E:x:ist~mt ,

tr . by

I
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empirical reality only .

Jaspers t proposed . . vay to search for Ab-

solute Being through philosophi cal belief is

~

priori marked vdth

uncertt;inty, sj.nce . a ccording to his m>lIl \fIOrd s. thi s \'I}'ay is the

",-yay of i gnorance .. 14
to a kno\'dedge of

But r emaining ignorant one \<Jil1 never come

anyt~ling,

just as a blind man 'lfn il never be

able to see light as l ong as he remains .blind .

Therefore it is

no t-.ronder that Jasper s ' "momentat'y break-through 01' hope and
confident affirmation of reality of the Ground of being , U a s

Fathe.r Klenk remarks , 15 flsoon sinks in an icy eold po.s sibility
that t his is only .delusion . lt

If fta small mistake in the begin-

ning is a great one in the end , " as St . Thomas 16 says paraphrasi
Aristotle , than is it no wonder that a system built on que stionable foundations must sooner or later

Jaspers has founded his

collaps~?

philo soph~of

existence on the

Kantian hypothesi s, according to ,,{hleh phenomen.on can in no way
manifest noumenon; that phenomenon presents only an empty objectivity and not the thi ng as it i s in itself.

This doctrine "'lhic h

teache s that by kno\rdng a phenomenon or object we still c annot

14 See above , p . 17.
1.5

G. Friedric h Klenk, S . J •• "Del' .ferne Gott, "

del' Zeit, 145 , Her der, Freiburg , 1949-50 ,

~immeu

22 $ ~

16 Thomas Aquinas , Saint , De Ente et Essentia, On Being
and Essence , tr . lrith Introduction
l\Yotesny A. :f.ia urer-;Toront o, Canada, 1949 , 24 .

ana
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know the thing in itself is self- contradictory .
were really

res~icted

If our knowledge

only tp the appearances of thing s, then on

what ground could we posit that there are ttappearances?tt

Is it

possible that there exist llappearance" If.rithout the thing lflhich it
represents existing?
'~oreover ,

lute Belngor God.

Jaspers has confused i'inite being lrnt h

bso-

" Be ing in ltself r" (das Seln .!!! sich) , " being

as such u (daa Sein schlechthin) or uabsolute being" (absolutes
Sein) t which he is speaking of, is nothing else but God .

We at -

tribute the term f1absolute being" to God most properly,

It means

that God nis" absolutel¥"
rely .

while created beings nare" only relati-

God i! being, creatures only

!l!!! haing., since being is

the very essenee of God, as St. Thomas says:17

"It is impossible

that in God Hi s being should differ fr om His essence."

t

Jaspers confuses finite being with Absolute Being in the sense
that he speaks of them as if they were beings of the same order.
Speaking of God he uses categories of sense experience only , for
example, he r e j ects the principle of causality for the reason
that it transgresses our experience:

we do not find in reality

any being which would be causa. sui iESiu,s. H~

Or, \"Then he tries

17 Thomas Aquinas , Saint, Summa 1'heologica, I, 3, 4;
see also ibid.t I , 13, 11 .
1$

Cf . Jaspers , Philosophie , 705-732 .
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to de:fine God as nactuality without possibility, " he immediately
r e jeets this concept on the basis tha.t there is nothing i n reality
which would be actuality without possi bility . 19

Therefor e it is

a contradict ion ",,:hen Jaspers t r ies to define God by a categor y
of empirical reality , such as the category of time .

He says that

we must think of God as existing in time, since exclusion of time
would mean "only a concept without reality," and at the same time
we must admit that God is "timeless. n since other \-nse He would
not be eternal .
Jaspers tries to convi nce us that t here is an intrinsic
contradiction in every name we attribute to God, since

"'119

cannot

express God by any category without being compelled at the same
time to express Him by a contrary ca.tegory, which l'lou1d destroy
the former.

For example , \'1e must character ize God as a unity of

being and non-being .
stimmtes

Et",,~a$ ))

God is no det erminate being (nicht ain be-

but such being is "the ve ry being, n the most

perfect being , since here is excluded every li mitation and determination.

Thus, God is being and non-being at the same time ,

which is a contradictor y pOSSibility.20
is only a supposed contradiction .

1tle

can answer that this

We c all God a flnon- being ft in

the sense that He excludes every limitation and i mperfection .

19

Ibi d .

20

See above , pp . 37-3 t:L.

I

gO
But this does not destroy the notion of being f since imperfection
only shows that there is a lack of being.
lacking being i n so far as i t is i mperfect .

An imperfect t hing is
Therefore ""'hen God

"lacks" imperfections and limitations , i t means tha.t He is being
in the most eminent way.
Jaspers ' rejection of the principle of camsality is
fatal to his whole theodicy.

His cipher- theory loses all value

by denying a minimum of kno\oTle dge of what God is, since, accord ....
ing to Jas pers, the ciphers signify that God exists, but they do
not give us the least idea. of God's nature .

This is a self-con-

tradictory proposition, since if we did not have

~

knowledge

of what God is , then how CQuid we know that there is a similarity
bet'tveen the symbol and the thing symbolized, i. e. t between
ci phers and God?

Jaspers' symbol-language speaks ambiguously of

God.

I t is an ftemptyfl language , as he himself admits: "symbolknowledge i s no knowledge. tt 21 We come to the knm'lledge of God 's
existence based on the principle of causality.
knowledge

In our natural

we start 'trl th things which are better known to us and

go to things which are less known, as St. rrhomas says , 22 "beginning with easier matters, we may advance more suttably in kn01Plledge . n

Since effects ar e better known

~

21

See above, p . 45 .

22

'fhomas Aquina s , Saint, De Ente

us than their cause

~

Essentia,

2lh

and si nce no effect can exist without a cause , according to the
principle of causality , we go from things in the world to God as
their cause .

A mutual

ca~sality

of things themselves is not pos-

sible since an infinite series of finite causes cannot explain
the creation of things.

Therefore there must exist a causa sui

ipsius , an uncreated cause, or ' God, Who is the efficient cause
of all creation.
Pa.raphrasing Jaspers that ue. demonstrated God is no
God , n2 3 we can also admit that this is true in the sense that if
our knowledge exhausted God , He would no longer be God o In a
certain sense we a.lso admit a sort of "destruction" of our knowledge when we are dealing with God , i . e ., when we admit the imperfection of t his knowledge .
such extent that

God .

\-/e

Yet this destruction is not o£

could not know anything of the nature of

St. Thomas teaches that w'e have some positive knowledge of

what God is .

Perhaps we are not capable of knowledge of the

essence of God as such, yet we have an essential knowledge of
the absolute attributes of God , although in an imperfect manner,
namely, by means of an analogy of proportionality (ana-logia proportionalitatis) .
of God?

How do we come to this analogical knowledge

Our natural knowledge of God is based on the sensible

23

See above , p . 40 .

$2

character of our knowledge:
means of sensi ble reality ~ 24

we come to the knowledge of God by
Thus , all our natural kno'l,'l'ledge of

God is causal and therefore it indicates that we can have neither
univoca1., nor ae quivocal knowledge of Hi m.

Manser is right in

remarking 25 t hat we cannot know God univocally , since He is
beyond all categories .
finite cause . 26

A limited effe ct cannot exhau st i ts in-

Also aequivocatio, \~i ch designates only a si-

milarity of names in absolute variety of things , cannot reveal to
us the nature of God . 27 But we have an analogical knowle dge of
God , whic h st ands in the middle between univocat io and aeguivocati o .
But

All the proofs of God 's existence are based on analogy .

is there really possible a bridge betl'leen

£!!§.

!.E. a1:1.0 and

ens !! se , betv'leen the finite and the i nfinite?

I s there any pro-

portion existing between effe ct and i t s cause ?

In other words ,

can 've knO\.., anything of the qui dditat,i ve nature of God?

We canno

knOirl by our natural knowledge, as St . Thomas says , 2g the essence
of God as such , sinc e no

~

partici patum can ever exhaust t he

24 nNatur a1is nostra cognitio !. sensu princi pium
sumit . n, Thomas Aquinas , Saint , Summa Theologi ca , I t 12 , 12; see
also ibi d ., ad 2: "Deu s naturali cognitlone cognoscitur per
phantasmata effectus ~ . n

25 Gall us :r.l. Manser ., Das \'lesen des Thomi smus , Dritte
Auf lage , Paulusverlag , Frei burg in aer Schweiz , 1949, 479 .
26

Thomas Aquinas , Saint , Su.mma gontra Gentiles , I f 32 .

27

Ibid ., I , 33 .
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~

subs istens .

But we can have some positive knowledge of the

nature of God through His absolute attributes .
fines tnese

St . Thomas de-

as the attributes in the definition of
which is not included any defect . 29 By knowing these attributes
attrib~tes

of God we get some knowledge of the nature of God itse l f .
that possi ble?

There must be something quidditative common

between creatures and God .

Absolute attributes designate some-

thing "'Ihich in God really exists (in Deo ~ existunt ) .'3
though

How is

Al-

they db not exhaust the essence of God completel! (non

I
I

totaliter totum) , yet these attributes represent to us the divine
essence !tself (representantes di vinam essentiam) . 3l

The absolut~

attributes are to be ascribed to God substantia.lly (,substantia ...
liter) and proper ly (proprie} ) 2

Hence although we can know

through these attributes the divine nature essentially , yet our
knowle dge is imperfect .

A perfect knowledge of something pre-

supposes the knmvledge of what a thing is
it i s (~ecundum guo!! est ) . 33

il/e

(t£ quod est) and hm!

can arrive at some knowl edge of

the quidditative nature of God , i . e ., we can have some knowledge
of whai? God is, but we cannot know how He iS t because we cannot
29 "lsb in guoru!!! definitione nOD: clauditur defectus . " ,
{;Juestiones disputatae de verit ate , 2, 11 .
30

Thomas Aquina s , Saint ; Quest . disp .

31

Thomas Aquinas , Saint , Quest . disp . de verit ate , 2, 1

32

Thomas Aquinas , Saint , Summa 1'heologica, I , 13 , 2 .

d~

potentia , 7,5

exhaust the divine essence 'ltlhich is !!!:!bstantiae pellagus in1'ini ...

~ .34 As finite beings we cannot exhaust the infinite bei ng of
God , since we only have being, God is

ipsum~ .

In so far as

our natural knO'ltlle dge of God is imper fe et, it is negati va .

But

t his ' does not mean that our posit i ve knowledge of God is false .
St . Thomas a'-ree s ' with t he Pseudo- Dionysius that our negative
knowl edge of God is more real than the positive . 35 For example ,
we know that God i s infinite , but we cannot grasp what His infinity really means .

In short, we can

knO'\~

something of the qui d-

ditative natur e of God , and in t hi s respect our knm'!ledge 1,S positive, but our knowledge is i mperfect , and in this sense it is
negative.

Hence our knowledge of God is not absolutely negative .
Perfectiones simplices as such make possible an analogy

between creatures and God .
tures also are

~,

God is ens, verum, bonum; the crea-

verum, bont\m .

The s e perfections ut sic

express no modus essen(U ai t her of God
express the

r:~ l ation

.Q£

of creature .

They only

existing between God and create d t hings !>

These per fections ar e for both intrinsi cally nece,s sary .

This

points to nothi ng else but to proporti ona.li ty existi ng betYA'een
the finite and t he infinite.

Although there is no identity of

33

1'homas Aquina s , Saint , Quest. di sp . de

34

Thomas AqUina s, Saint, Summa '1'heologiea , I , 13, §ld 2 .

35

Ibi d .

ver~t .,

2 , 11 .
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modus essendi between God and creatures , yet there is a similitude
of relationship to these

sin~le

perfections .

In this sense analogy of proporti onality is a bridge

-

between ens finitum and

1mB
....-.....

infinitum .

0n the one hand , there is

saved the immense distance between God and creature, but , on the
other hand, the analogy of proportionality enables us to have
some insight into the nature of God .

Therefore instead of preach-

ing a complete destruction of our knowledge of God Jaspers rather
should admit only imperfection of that knowledge .
ion comes for him not for the reason that

'l>le

This destruct-

would not kno'Vl1' that

God exists, but only because we cannot have the least knowledge
of His nature .

There is denied the possibility of a contact

between us and God because of the absolute infinity of the essence
of God .

But here again Jaspers is self-contradic,t ory, since by

this he indirectly proves at least one attribute of God, name ly,
His inf:i.nity"
Jasperst attempt to "demythize" religion must be categorically r e jected .

. en he confers on philosophy the right to

ffpur ify tt reli p.:ion,. it means that he brings

reli g~on

to trial in

the court of philosophy o This means nothing else but the secularization of religion .

We characterize this attempt of Jas pers

as unjust , since to admit only that which can be grasped by reason
and to reject everything that surpasses reason means to reject
all religion as such.

Divine reason cannot be brought to tri al by

86
human reason .

Although J a spers says that he is fighting against

tithe untruth of objectivized religion" only, and that he respects
religion as such , but as "the truth of others," nevertheless in
actual fact this does not change the matter, since actually every
religion is flobjective!t in the sense that there is no r eligion
without dogma , cult or Church .

There f ore by rejecting the "ob-

jective" form of r eligion Jaspers r e jects religion as such .

His

declarati on that he r espects religion as "truth of others ft does
not change the matter :

the question here is not about religion

as such , but about religiou s conviction .

We fight against a

"strange truth" only when the qu'e stion is not about di.fferent
truths , but about trut h and unt ruth .

For example , there is no

need that mathematics should right against biology , but chemistry
. had t o fight agai nst alchemy , because the latter was proved as
untrut h .

Thus , it is impossible , that , fighting against religion

as such , one could respect it as "the truth of others . "
I t is impossible to grasp the essence of a religion for
one who himself remains outside of it .

Jaspers r emains outside

of religi ous life confining himself to philosophy only .

His

philosophy itself excludes the pos si bility of religion, since
where a personal God is denied , religion is impossi ble .

Also

he could not grasp the essence of reli gion , because he denied
the possibility of Revelation .

By the fact of his deni al of

Revelation Jasper s does not distinguish between natural religions

87
and the revealed religion .

Natural religions, since they are

products of human reason , principally can be questioned by our
intellect.

For example , Greek philosophy really demythized Greek

religi on "

But the relation of philosophy and religion is differ-

ent when

''f9

are confr onted with the Revealed Religion..

phi losophy is not competent to ' reject Revelat ion .

Here

Only a certain

philosophy might reject Revelation but not philosophy

~

such .

Philosophy as such , or human reason , does not exclude !! priori
the possibility of Revelation since this possibilit;y is not selfcontr adictory .

Rather philosophically considered it is possible

to .a dmit t ha.t if t.here exist s a God (Jaspers admit s that) He can
reveal Hi mself to us .

The denial of Revelation is based usually

on the absolutization of the human intellect .
inconsistent:

Here Jaspers is

he would relativize every philosophical truth and

at the same time he would absolutize philosophy to such a degree
that t o its court he would bring reli l;ion itself .

The absoluti-

zation of philosophy leads unfortunately to relativization of
philosophical truthl By rej ecting Hevelation because of t he absolute unknowability of God

aspers absoluti zes the i mperfection

and limitation of our reason.
Jaspers calls all the truths and dogmas of Revelation
tlabsurditi es . It

But

't~e

can answer that they are not absurdities

but deep truths and myst eries.

Absurdity is that which is self-

contradictory and hence repugnant to our reason .

But mysteries

gg

surpass our reason and therefore cannot be grasped by it .

Reve-

lation reveals to us facts not as contradictory to reason but as
exceeding its limits .

Hence our reason ha.s no right to question

the validity of such truths , because they are beyond the reach of
r eason .

Just as every affirmation of reason is possible only t'lit

in the limits of reason , so every negation"

Beyond its limits

reason Can neither affirm nor deny .
Summarizing the thoughts expounded in this work the
author comes t o the following conclu sions:

(1) One cannot accept

Jasper s' philosophy in so far as it tries to base metaphysics on
morality, since that i mplies the impossibility of our reason to
come to the

kno~lledge

of Absolute Being , but one can agree "nth

Jaspers that the searo h for and finding of God is the task not of
rea.s on only but it is the task of all the faculties of man .

(2 )

One cannot accept Ja sperst notion of truth, since by elevati ng to
the r ank of truth every subjective conviction he degrades truth
itself , but Jaspers rightly emphasizes the fact that truth must b
realized in life , not only knoWD .

(3)

Jaspers' notion of God i s

unacceptable ., since his immanent Transcendence is not a personal
God , but his philosophy , which in solution of the problem of God' .
existence is psychology of sea.rch rather than metaphysics i n the
proper sense, allows us to understand better those who are seeki
f or God in an invincible tens ion of faith and unbelief .•
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